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Abstract 
Can the European Union shape global regulatory policy? If it can, what conditions exist? This 
is the essential question at the centre of this thesis. This thesis will employ the case of global 
data protection regulation and put the two opposing theories of realist Daniel Drezner and 
institutionalist Anu Bradford against each other. 
To answer the first questions data protection authorities around the world have been asked 
to complete questionnaires on principles in their laws and these have been matched with 
common European and non-European data protection frameworks. The data indicates that 
the European Union is able to shape global data protection legislation 
Two answer the second question, the two theories have been compared and confronted with 
the results from the first research question. While both authors cannot be completely proven 
or disproven, taking only their central disagreement if the European Union can shape policy 
against the preferences of the United States, Bradford having answered this positively 
emerges with the data on her side. 
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1 Introduction 
“EUROPE IS STILL A SUPERPOWER” 
It is questionable how many would agree with this remarkable claim by Andrew Moravcsik 
(2017). The growing consensus seems to be that Europe was never able to compete with the 
hegemon of the second half of the 20th century, the United States. And now that the US is 
flirting with a more isolationist policy, Europe could be finally getting its chance to lead again. 
However, it can be surely agreed upon the fact that Europe was neither the in past decades 
and nor will it be in the near future a leader in military power. And while Europe rested long 
on its economic importance, there are signs of its vanishing. Europe’s population is ageing 
and shrinking, and its political process is slow and complicated. So why after all would Europe 
still be a superpower?  
Although often not taken seriously – depending on the ideological perspective – Europe 
always has and still does hold an enormous amount of soft power. And with this, Europe 
possesses the ability to shape the face of market regulation worldwide. However, the 
question of Europe’s strength remains – when the United States abandon multilateralism, are 
the Europeans able to keep wide international cooperation alive? When the United States 
withdraw from the Iran nuclear deal framework, are the Europeans able to keep the deal 
running? Can Europe really shape the way policies look around the world? 
Daniel Drezner and Anu Bradford strongly disagree on questions like these. While Drezner 
contributes his theory from a realist point of view, positing that the European Union cannot 
shape global policies against the preferences of the United States. Bradford on the other 
hand, sees the world from an institutionalist point of view and believes the European Union 
can “wield unilateral influence across a number of areas of law” (Bradford, 2012, p. 1), 
determining global standards without using coercion. One of the fields both authors apply 
their theories to, is the field of data protection. 
Data protection is a field where one could argue that the United States seem unwilling to lead. 
It can be alleged, that the US is prioritising the economic interests of Silicon Valley over the 
privacy interests of its and the world's citizens. Europeans, on the other hand, seem to share 
a more protective approach to privacy. This leaves plenty of room for data protection 
becoming a European success story, proving that Europe has the capability, know-how and 
state of mind to deal with the pressing issues of the 21st century. This could be the time to 
shine – proving that Europe has enough influence and reach, demonstrating its actorness to 
the world and even spread its standard against the stated preferences of the United States. 
Thinking this further and expanding this idea on other policy areas, this could even be a 
chance for the EU to give life to the aspirations of the European treaties, that aim to spread 
the EU's understanding of human rights around the world. 
Data protection is becoming an increasingly important topic in daily life, fuelled by a constant 
barrage of privacy violations and breaches. Each and everyone’s life is increasingly 
transferred onto digital devices and platforms; With these platforms knowing almost 
everything about us – just think about the intimate details your google queries reveal about 
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you – in conjunction with advances in machine learning and artificial intelligence, that are 
able to make sense of human behaviour in an ever increasing measure, people’s privacy is 
not only at risk, it is being breached on a daily basis, in plain sight. The data stored on these 
platforms can be monitored, analysed and monetised for commercial and political interests 
in very personal and potentially manipulative ways that were unthinkable only ten years ago. 
The individual can do little to protect him- or herself against these reaches into each one’s 
private life, as usage of these platforms has become a necessity in modern societies – 
whoever is not on these platforms loses out on social life. Therefore, it appears that only the 
state can reasonably protect the individual by adopting legislation that builds fair and 
respectful rules for data usage and data protection. 
Now putting all these considerations in a nutshell – data protection becoming an increasingly 
important topic for almost all citizens around the world and the fact that the EU has a 
seemingly citizen-friendlier approach of protecting data than the US, the question arises, if 
Europe’s standards are already travelling around the world.  
Therefore, this thesis is set out to answer two related questions: whether policy convergence 
is happening in data protection, and what that says about how policy convergence works, in 
context with the two opposing theoretical frameworks of Drezner and Bradford. These 
questions will not only firstly answer if the European data protection standard is being 
globalised; they will secondly also identify if the European Union is able to establish its 
standard against the preferences of the United States of America, thereby answering 
questions on the actorness of the EU; and thirdly provide an answer on a fundamental clash 
between two opposing theoretical camps.  
In order to answer these two questions, this thesis is divided into seven parts. After this 
introduction, chapter two will introduce the field of policy convergence and the two 
theoretical frameworks as well as compare them on a general level. Chapter three will 
provide an overview of the relevant data protection frameworks in the world, so that the 
reader understands the different regulatory approaches to data protection. Following this, 
chapter four will explain the research design and used data. In this chapter, it will be 
explained how this thesis aims to use data collected from questionnaires sent to data 
protection authorities on the characteristics of their legislation to answer the question 
whether policy convergence is happening around the world. Chapter five will then take the 
data collected and answer the first research question. The second research question will be 
answered in chapter 6 by synthesising all the previously gained information on the theories, 
the data protection frameworks, the data on national legislation and by adding contextual 
information. The thesis will end with a conclusion, highlighting the most important inferences 
and suggesting a way forward.  
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2 Theoretical framework: Policy convergence theory 
This chapter’s initial purpose is to introduce the reader to policy convergence theory 
and to the writing of the two selected theorists. In this, firstly an overview of the field 
will be given. Subsequently, the conditions that the authors identify for policy 
convergence will be compared. Lastly, the two theories will be looked at more in-
depth. The wider purpose of this chapter is to introduce the analytical framework used 
in chapter five to answer the first research question and to provide the necessary 
information for the analysis which of the introduced conditions are necessary for 
policy convergence, which will be performed in chapter six. 
_____ 
The seminally influential Colin J. Bennet defined policy convergence as “the tendency of 
societies to grow more alike, to develop similarities in structures, processes and 
performances” (1991, p. 1), a definition that has achieved broad consensus in the field (Knill, 
2005, p. 765). 
There is a multitude of different approaches to policy convergence theory (or as it is 
alternatively called, regulatory convergence theory), stemming from the many academic 
disciplines the authors originate from. There are related concepts such as policy transfer, 
isomorphism and policy diffusion, but due to this thesis's focus on the characteristics and 
change in similarity of policies, it will focus on policy convergence (Knill, 2005, p. 767). When 
analysing the causes and conditions put forth by policy convergence, Holzinger & Knill (2005, 
p. 778; Knill, 2005, p. 766) identify an increasing number of publications on the field in recent 
years, but also suggest a lack of “systematic theory-building” at the time. Drezner (2008, p. 
3) concurs and writes that there is “increased scholarly attention on how the global economy 
is regulated in an era of globalization. However, the theoretical debates on this topic leave 
much to be desired.” 
It is clear when going through some of the theoretical writing on policy convergence that 
authors utilise a lot of overlapping conceptualisations, but use differing language to describe 
often similar concepts.  
DiMaggio & Powell (1983) identify coercion, mimetic processes and normative pressures as 
deciding factors for policy convergence. 
The seemingly most influential academic writing in the field of policy convergence, evaluated 
by number of citations,1 comes from Colin J. Bennett (1991), providing an overview of the 
literature that existed at the time of writing and - possibly explaining the continued popularity 
- setting out to provide a guide for future research. He saw convergence occurring through 
emulation, elite networking, harmonisation and penetration. 
Dolowitz & Marsh (2000) focus on the aspects of voluntary versus coercive convergence. 
                                                        
1 1417 citations per Google Scholar: 
https://scholar.google.se/scholar?cites=11880719927176825435 
Including but not limited to – Theoretical framework: Policy convergence theory 
 
4 
Hoberg (2001) classifies factors for increasing convergence as: parallel domestic problem 
pressures, emulation, international legal constraints and international economic integration. 
Simmons & Elkins (2004) work with the term diffusion instead of convergence and see three 
mechanisms: direct economic competition, informational networks and social emulation. 
In their influential paper2, Holzinger & Knill (2005, p. 780) attempt to analyse the existing 
literature and summarise its scattered mechanisms and language into a single set of 
descriptors. 
Mechanism Stimulus Response 
Imposition Political demand or pressure Submission 
International 
harmonisation 
Legal obligation through 
international law 
Compliance 
Regulatory 
competition 
Competitive pressure Mutual adjustment 
Lesson-drawing Problem pressure Transfer of model found elsewhere 
Transnational 
problem-solving 
Parallel problem pressure 
Adoption of commonly developed 
model 
Emulation Desire for conformity Copying of widely used model 
International 
policy promotion 
Legitimacy pressure Adoption of recommended model 
Independent 
problem-solving 
Parallel problem pressure Independent similar response 
Table 1: Mechanisms based on Holzinger & Knill (2005, p. 780) 
Next to these mechanisms, which will be utilised in chapter six, Holzninger & Knill also 
introduce a set of indicators. While mechanisms describe the process of policy convergence, 
i.e. how policy convergence happens, indicators describe the status of policy convergence, 
i.e. how far along the policy convergence process has got or whether it's occurring at all. The 
three indicators determining if policy convergence is present are: degree, direction and scope 
of convergence. This thesis will use these indicators as an analytical framework for gathering, 
systemising and analysing the data collected through the questionnaire in chapter 5.1 
(Holzinger & Knill, 2005, p. 776). 
The degree of convergence helps to determine whether policies across countries are similar 
enough to be deemed converging or not. Here Holzninger & Knill (p. 776) differentiate 
between policy outputs (the de-jure state of the policy) and policy outcomes (the de-facto 
state of the policy). The authors define how they measure the degree of convergence, which 
can simply be summarised as: The degree of convergence increases when policies become 
                                                        
2 633 citations per Google Scholar: 
https://scholar.google.se/scholar?cites=13481468155198106099 
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more similar. In their writing, they focus on policy outputs and this thesis will do so too. In 
relation to this, they state their opinion on why governments legislate: As a reaction to 
problem pressure, based on experience gained elsewhere, under pressure from powerful 
external actors, due to economic pressure and because of a legal obligation. These indicators 
make it possible to describe and analyse policy convergence, though they in themselves are 
not explanations for why the convergence happens. These aspects will be considered later.  
The direction of convergence is related to the strictness of the regulation. Laissez-faire-
policies are considered the “bottom”, interventionist policies the “top”. This categorisation 
is based on (Drezner, 2001), who has developed his own systematisation of the field. This 
dimension has a normative aspect, however, for example, in data protection strict regulation 
is often considered normatively good for the individual, even though it impedes the freedom 
of companies. It is therefore a question of values. 
The scope of convergence describes the number of countries affected by the given 
“convergence mechanism” (Holzninger & Knill, 2005, p. 778). 
I have adapted the indicators identified by Holzniger & Knill to use them as an analytical 
framework to systematise the data collected for my study. For this purpose, I have modified 
the research questions, simplified them for readability and removed the reference point, as 
it did not offer an increase in analytical clarity. The operationalisation was not modified. 
Indicator Research question Operationalisation 
Degree of 
convergence 
To what degree have policies become 
more similar? 
Decrease in standard 
deviation over time 
Convergence 
direction 
In what direction (strict or lenient) have 
policies developed? 
Mean change 
Convergence 
scope 
Which (groups of) countries are converging 
in which direction? 
Number of countries and 
policies 
Table 2: Modified indicators table based on Holzninger & Knill, 2005, p. 778 
2.1 Theory comparison 
In this chapter I will introduce the two main policy convergence theories used in this thesis. 
They will provide the theoretical basis for the empirical discourse and be used to identify the 
conditions that are required for policy convergence. The first theory is Daniel W. Drezner’s 
theory from All Politics is Global (2008). The second theory is Anu Bradford’s Brussels Effect 
(2012). Both authors identify causes and conditions for regulatory convergence to happen 
and those will be introduced in this chapter. 
Before starting the more detailed comparison of the two theories, it is necessary to make a 
couple of introductory distinctions.  
It is important to understand that there is a difference between the conditions for policy 
convergence and the causes of policy convergence. Conditions are required for policy 
convergence to occur, but do not necessitate or guarantee it. Causes, on the other hand, are 
Including but not limited to – Theoretical framework: Policy convergence theory 
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the actual trigger for it, the mechanisms, processes, events, that when the right conditions 
are met, will make policy convergence actually happen. This is an important distinction to 
make, but the authors in the field (and especially Drezner) do not very clearly differentiate 
between the two. As a side note, the trigger does not necessarily have to be an active process 
and initiated by the country whose law is being adopted, e.g. the mechanism “emulation” 
shows that third countries can take up part of another country's regulation by their own 
volition.  
Secondly, it is important to differentiate between why a rule emerges as the global standard 
at all and why one specific rule is becoming that global standard. So, in other words, why it 
makes sense for governments to agree that there should be a global standard and why 
governments decide for some specific rule to be that standard. Holzninger & Knill look at why 
policy convergence happens at all, i.e. why states' regulation becomes more similar, but they 
do not look at why a specific standard is emerging. Bradford on the other hand describes 
conditions that make the regulation of the EU first de-facto and then de-jure the global 
regulatory standard, i.e. why one specific rule is becoming the global standard. In this regard 
Drezner is closer to Bradford than he is to Holzninger & Knill, as he is also mostly interested 
in why a specific standard becomes the worldwide standard, but he also covers aspects of 
why a standard is emerging at all. His scope is therefore a hybrid of the other two theories. 
 Hozninger & Knill (2005) Drezner (2008) Bradford (2012) 
Causes vs conditions Causes Hybrid Conditions 
Any rule vs a specific rule Any rule Hybrid A specific rule 
Table 3: Meta comparison Drezner & Bradford 
Thirdly, what sets the Brussels Effect apart from other research on regulatory convergence is 
the more differentiated proposition on the conditions for why a particular regulatory standard 
becomes the global one. The most commonly mentioned factors determining regulatory 
convergence are market power and economies of scale, which Drezner also mostly focuses 
on, but Bradford arrives at a more nuanced systematisation. While market power is a part of 
the conditions, Bradford identifies additional factors that are not guaranteed to be present, 
but are required to be fulfilled for the effect to take place. With this, she proposes an 
alternative understanding why a certain standard is becoming the world standard to the 
established theories.  
It should also be mentioned that Bradford is looking at the issue from the perspective of a 
regulator and not from a market perspective. Drezner takes a similar position here, as he is 
also only interested in the state perspective. Even though Bradford assumes private 
companies to have an important role through the de-facto effect, the rules still come from 
public actors. In her theory, private companies are only the middle man and do not play an 
active role. Therefore, all the conditions for policy convergence that she develops relate to 
characteristics of the government, not of a company. Companies are only part of the 
mechanism and the process begins and ends with governments. Drezner argues that “great 
powers – defined here as governments that oversee large internal markets – remain actors 
Including but not limited to – Theoretical framework: Policy convergence theory 
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writing the rules” (Drezner 2008, p. 5) and thus agrees with Bradford. Even though Holzninger 
& Knill do not discuss the aspect of public versus private actorness, their assumptions clearly 
show they are considering the state to be the actor that shapes the global rules. There are 
some theories that suggest private organisations take a more leading role in globalised 
regulation (e.g. Büthe & Mattli, 2011), but I deliberately do not engage with those theories, 
as the policy field of data protection is a distinctly state-driven regulatory field. 
In addition to this, Bradford makes an important distinction between de-facto and de-jure 
regulatory convergence. Previous research has concentrated almost exclusively on the de-
jure effect, meaning when regulators or governments adopt the same or similar regulatory 
standard in law. Bradford crucially points out that this is not actually necessary for a global 
regulatory standard to emerge. Today, in many fields there is a high degree of consolidation 
in the corporate environment, with multinational, globalised companies being dominant 
players, being able to set standards for their supply chain, exporting the same product with 
minimal alterations to markets that are used to products being the same everywhere. This 
means that when such a multinational company commits to a regulatory standard, it can set 
the de-facto global standard in this field, making de-jure regulatory convergence just the 
codification of what is practiced already anyway. 
2.2 Comparing conditions 
Holzninger & Knill’s framwork will mostly be used as an analytical framework. As they do not 
identify conditions, but causes, only Drezner and Bradford will be compared below. 
Bradford argues that there are five conditions for the Brussels Effect to take place. According 
to her theory other territories in the world fulfil some of the conditions, but only the EU fulfils 
all and is therefore able to influence the global regulation. Drezner, on the other hand, 
identifies two conditions which are required to shape international regulation. 
2.2.1 Market power 
Drezner's two conditions for one standard actually succeeding in becoming the global 
standard are relatively simple. The first is the size of the internal market, as can be taken from 
Drezner's focus on it. He also suggests that currently, only the United State and the European 
Union possess enough market power to shape regulation, but they cannot do so in opposite 
directions, meaning both need to agree to make a rule the global rule (Drezner, 2008, p. 88).  
Bradford also regards market power as a condition for regulatory convergence to happen. 
While she regards the United States, China and Japan to also have markets big enough to 
“use their markets as leverage”, her view focuses more on the EU and she therefore points 
out that the EU (and EEA states) represent a huge single market where the same regulation 
applies, mandating that a good that can be sold in one member state can be sold in any other 
member state. Therefore, a company can produce one product for the whole single market. 
(Bradford, 2012, p. 11f.). 
2.2.2 Regulatory capacity 
For Bradford, regulatory capacity is set out to develop slowly from the market size of a 
country. Even though China has a very big economy, its regulatory capacity is limited by its 
Including but not limited to – Theoretical framework: Policy convergence theory 
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“regulatory experience and institutional capacity to enforce their norms” (Bradford, 2012, p. 
13). This benefits the EU and the US, as their historically grown economies give them an 
advantage in experience and capacity to make sound rules and enforce them, to the point of 
excluding them from market access. Even though the EU’s regulatory capacity is a newer 
development than the US's, it is based on the significant experience of its member states and 
did therefore develop quickly (Bradford, 2012, p. 12ff.). 
Drezner does not consider this aspect. 
2.2.3 Preference for strict rules 
Bradford stipulates, that setting the strictest standard is a necessary condition to set the de-
facto global standard, since if another territory would set a stricter standard, companies can 
no longer only abide by the first standard to satisfy all global regulatory requirements. On the 
one hand wealthier countries have a higher capacity to prioritise consumer protection over 
profitability, but on the other hand it is also a question of ideology. As opposed to the US, the 
EU follows the “precautionary principle”, meaning a product has to be proven safe before it 
can be sold. Though at points it seems Bradford simply regards Brussels as the most 
technocratic actor, giving it the most “stringent” rules. The US follow the opposite principle 
where a product has to be proven unsafe, so it can be banned from sales. This leads to more 
and stricter regulation from the EU system (Bradford, 2012, p. 14ff.). 
Drezner does not consider this aspect. 
2.2.4 Predisposition to regulate inelastic targets 
Producers in elastic markets, such as finance, can engage in forum shopping, i.e. avoid 
regulation by changing their jurisdiction. This is especially true in case the product is 
immaterial. According to Bradford the EU is avoiding this by targeting inelastic markets, such 
as retail, as consumers in these markets do not change the jurisdiction in order to buy a 
product cheaper and companies therefore have to comply to the rules of the EU (Bradford, 
2012, p. 16f.). 
Drezner does not consider this aspect. 
2.2.5 Non-divisibility of standards 
Bradford explains that non-divisibility of standards occurs when it is cheaper for a company 
to comply only with one regulatory framework, based either on legal, technical or economic 
reasoning. This is essentially an economies of scale argument, where due to the products' 
characteristics, it makes economically more sense to produce one unified product. In this 
case that regulator is the most stringent regulator and adhering to its standards almost 
automatically will also satisfy the other regulatory frameworks, making other regulators 
unnecessary.  
An example Bradford gives of a non-divisible standard is the chemicals market. Here 
companies only produce one range of products, comply to the European standard and sell it 
worldwide, because it is cheaper to produce one line under the higher cost of the stricter 
European market than it is to create a second line of products that conform to another set of 
regulations. An area where standards can be divided is labour standards. The EU has labour 
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standards for EU workers, but does not regulate labour standards in general for products 
entering the EU. Companies can therefore choose to produce under different/lower 
standards in another jurisdiction and undercut the EU labour standards. 
Drezner does not consider this aspect. 
2.2.6 Usage of IGOs and NGOs 
Drezner also envisions a crucial role for international governmental organisations (IGOs) and 
non-governmental organisations (NGOs). Harmonised standards require IGOs and NGOs for 
“regime management”: forming and enforcing the standard. In case of a club standard (see 
next section), they act as “cheerlead[ers] on the sidelines” and with sham standards they 
“act as imperfect substitutes for state action”. The great powers engage in forum shopping 
to maximise the use of these organisation (Drezner, 2008, p. 88). 
Bradford does not consider this aspect to be a necessary condition. 
2.2.7 Comparison conditions 
Cause or Condition Drezner (2008) Bradford (2012) 
Market power Hybrid Condition 
Regulatory capacity Not a factor Condition 
Preference for strict rules Not a factor Condition 
Predisposition to regulate inelastic markets Not a factor Condition 
Non-divisibility of standards Not a factor Condition 
Effective NGO and IGO usage Hybrid Not a factor 
Table 4: Overview of causes / conditions of selected policy convergence theories per the authors 
2.3 Drezner – All Politics is Global (2008) 
International relations heavyweight Daniel Drezner3 has informed4 the debate on regulatory 
convergence in his much-reviewed game-theory based book All politics is global: Explaining 
international regulatory regimes. For Drezner adjustment costs are the main obstacle to a 
globalised regulatory regime, which he considers to be a natural result of globalisation, as 
such a regime reduces costs. Simply put, a globalised regime emerges when the adjustment 
costs for states are low. Starting form this point of view, Drezner seeks to answer what 
standard regimes emerge under which conditions. He argues that the size of the internal 
market is still the most important determinant of regulatory power, meaning that states still 
set the standard - here he agrees with Bradford. Where their opinions diverge, however, is in 
whether and why a single global standard emerges (Drezner, 2008, p. 32ff.). Drezner 
identifies only the US and EU, based on internal market size, as able to set global standards, 
                                                        
3 Regular op-ed’s for the New York Times, Foreign Policy, The New Republic and Foreign Affairs 
4 985 citations per Google Scholar: 
https://scholar.google.se/scholar?cites=16659692181146125060 
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as they can force other states to join the 
standard by threatening to exclude them from 
their markets, applying coercive measures 
(Drezner, 2008, p. 38). He crucially proposes 
that the two powers cannot force each other 
to adopt a standard but need to cooperate to 
create a truly global standard together. They 
do this if they have similar interests (Drezner, 
2008, p. 70). Great power cooperation is a 
necessary, but not necessarily a sufficient 
condition for the establishment of a global 
standard. 
Even when they agree, disagreement with 
other international actors can lead to “Club 
standards”. These emerge because the 
adjustment cost for other countries are high and they therefore choose to not join the 
common standard. In some cases, the two powers can still enforce their standard as the 
global standard, by using an IGO, such as the OECD, as a way to (usually slowly) spread their 
preferred rule to a number of states high enough to make it the de-facto standard in the world 
(Drezner, 2008, p. 75ff.). 
Only when the US and EU as well as the other international actors agree can a truly 
harmonised standard emerge (Drezner, 2008, p. 72). 
A "Rival standard" can emerge when one of the great powers is able to bring a significant 
number of other international actors on board with their standard, which can acquire a critical 
mass. This gives other states an incentive to switch to that standard (Drezner, 2008, p. 79f.).  
When only one of the great powers tries to establish a standard, but finds no significant 
support among the other great powers and other international actors, a sham standard 
emerges. In this case there will almost certainly be no common global standard, as the 
market power of this standard is insufficient (Drezner, 2008, p. 81ff.). 
If the two dominant rule setters disagree on a standard no global standard will emerge, since 
if the other international actors disagree there will either be a club or a rival standard, but no 
harmonised one (Drezner, 2008, p. 72). Therefore, Drezner believes that neither great power 
can establish a standard on their own. In contradiction to this, Bradford considers that the 
EU has a bigger capacity to set the global standard, based on its more stringent regulatory 
process. 
2.4 Bradford - The Brussels Effect (2012) 
Anu Bradford coined the term “Brussels effect” in 2012, seeking to explain how private 
companies and governments worldwide are signing on to Brussels regulations. Bradford 
suggests that “the EU is currently the predominant regulatory regime that can wield unilateral 
influence across a number of areas of law” (Bradford, 2012, p. 10). 
Table 5: Typology of regulatory coordination from 
Drezner (2008, p. 72) 
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The Brussels Effect is based on two theorems on the US state-level. The first one is the 
“Delaware Effect” and describes how states lower their standards or offer incentives to 
companies to be incorporated in their territory, thereby engaging in a race to the bottom. The 
“California Effect”, on the contrary, explores the opposite dynamic. Since California is a huge 
market in the United States for companies to sell their products in and has a tendency to set 
strict standards, it has effectively often set the standard for the whole country and has 
therefore caused a race to the top (Bradford, 2012, p. 5). 
Example 1 – Delaware effect 
A relevant example of the Delaware effect is the competition to house the second 
headquarters of Amazon. A number of US cities (and Toronto) are in a race to the bottom to 
attain the tax revenue, affluent residents and image boost that being the second home of 
Amazon would bring, offering everything from deep tax breaks to giving away precious land 
for free. Here, the Delaware effect can be observed, as these cities are lowering their 
standards to attract a company. This is a situation where market access is not relevant and 
the ability of a single (devolved) government to prevent a race to the bottom is therefore very 
limited. Cities could negotiate common standards to prevent a race to the bottom and 
thereby engage in a localised version of “political globalisation of regulatory standards”, but 
there is a risk of defection or betrayal. In line with the prisoner’s dilemma in game theory, 
cities choose to not cooperate. In the absence of a higher level (federal) government or 
competition agency that is able and willing to set a common standard, a race to the bottom 
occurs.  
Example 2 – California effect 
The California effect is typically associated with environmental policy in the US. With the US 
federal government not being at the forefront of progressive environmental policy, California 
has historically picked up the slack. David Vogel (1995) discovered that often other states 
match the strict level of environmental protection without any legal requirement: California’s 
“standards remained stricter than those of any other state. In 1990, Congress brought 
national emission standards up to California’s and once again permitted California to impose 
stricter standards. It also gave other states the option of choosing either national or California 
standards. In 1994, 12 eastern states requested that the federal government permit them to 
adopt California’s new standards. These standards are in turn likely to become the basis for 
the next round of federal minimum requirements” (Vogel, 1995, p. 259). 
The Brussels Effect also seeks to debunk trade liberalisation theories of a “global race to the 
bottom” when it comes to standards, as the strict rules of the EU is one of the very reasons 
its standard is being taken up worldwide (Bradford, 2012, p. 4). This will be further 
investigated in chapter six. 
Bradford proposes two types of the Brussels Effect, one following the other: the de-facto 
Brussels Effect and the de-jure Brussels Effect. 
The de-facto Brussels Effect describes what one would arguably instinctively presume the 
Brussels Effects means when being made familiar with the theory. Based on the five 
conditions for unilateral influence that Bradford develops (market power, regulatory capacity, 
preference for strict rules, predisposition to regulate inelastic targets, non-divisibility of 
standards), multinational companies are choosing to adhere to a single rule for its product 
standards and choose the European one. This means that the Brussels rule is made the de-
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facto global rule, the rule that companies and consumers adhere to and experience, without 
any legal obligation to do so from the local government (Bradford, 2012, p. 5f.) 
The de-jure Brussels Effect is the next step in this process. Globalised, non-EU companies, 
having adopted the rules, now advocate (their) local governments to adopt the EU standard 
to create a level playing field for all companies and countries. When governments adopt the 
EU rule, they codify the de-facto standard in law, creating a de-jure rule (Bradford, 2012, p. 
6). 
_____ 
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3 Data protection frameworks 
This chapter’s initial purpose is to introduce the reader to the origins and development 
of data protection as an academic field as well as a legal and fundamental right. In 
this, the growing importance and relevance of this field should become apparent. 
Secondly, the chapter will explain the differences between the various data protection 
frameworks in the world. The wider purpose of this chapter is to help the reader 
understand what the key differences of the frameworks and the thinking behind them 
is, which will be important for the analysis in chapter five and six. 
______ 
3.1 Terminology 
Neither privacy nor data protection are defined legal terms and even legal professionals have 
struggled to find a common definition of the terms, with none prevailing and the terms being 
left in some degree of accepted vagueness (Finn, Wright, & Friedewald, 2013). Additionally, 
there are regional differences in the usage. For the purpose of this thesis, it is therefore 
important to clearly define what the term encompasses and what it doesn't. 
3.1.1 Privacy 
Privacy is often referred to as the overarching term and the earliest academic definition in 
1890, by Warren and Brandeis in the Harvard Law Review, attempted to box it in as “the right 
to be left alone” (Hijmans, 2016, p. 39). 
It usually includes the terms of data protection and data privacy as more modern 
developments, relating to the collection of data about a person. To this day there no agreed 
upon definition for privacy. In an attempt to narrow down the concept, Finn, Wright & 
Friedewald (2013) suggest seven types of privacy, which help close in on what privacy 
actually means. 
x Privacy of the person (keeping body functions and body characteristics private) 
x Privacy of behaviour and action (keeping habits, activities and practices private) 
x Privacy of communication (keeping analogue or virtual communication private) 
x Privacy of data and image (exercising control over data and its use) 
x Privacy of thoughts and feelings (exercising control over the sharing of thoughts and 
feelings) 
x Privacy of location and space (the right not to be identified, tracked or monitored in 
public spaces) 
x Privacy of association (the right to associate freely with whomever without being 
monitored) 
3.1.2 Data protection 
In the US the term data protection usually means the protection from unauthorised access 
(or access, use, disclosure, modification, and inspection of information) to data. This 
definition is close to the widely accepted definition of information security. 
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In contrast to this, data protection in Europe usually refers to the regulation of authorised 
processing of data by legal means and has no direct connection to concepts of information 
security. This makes sense considering the term was developed in the 1970s, where the 
possibilities of information technology did not make such thinking necessary yet (Guaman, 
2016). 
In this, one of the main divides between the US and Europe is already visible. While the US 
view is mainly concerned with illegal access, the European point of view is informed by its 
history and considers data to be a threat to fundamental rights, unless correctly regulated. 
3.1.3 Data privacy 
Data privacy, on the other hand, has a similar meaning in the US to the European 
understanding of data protection: in relation to regulation. The term is not so common in 
Europe outside of the United Kingdom, but is gaining traction, possibly due to the effort of 
making data protection less a technocratic exercise. The term data protection implies that 
what is being protected is the data, not the person the data is relating to (Hustinx, 2013, p. 1; 
Bygrave, 2012, p. 26). Even though this is not how the term is meant, it devaluates its 
relevance for people. Data privacy on the other hand has a connotation that brings it closer 
to the individual, due to the established relevance of “privacy” for an individual. On the other 
hand, other authors have criticised the term privacy for implying it is given to someone and it 
not being a right, while data protection implies an obligation (Martineau, 2018). 
In this thesis data protection and data privacy are being used synonymous, as relating to the 
regulation of data processing. 
3.2 Origins of Data Privacy 
Privacy as a general concept was already included in the 1950 European Convention on 
Human Rights (ECHR) of the Council of Europe (CoE): Article 8 codifies in general the “Right 
to respect for private and family life”. All member states of the Council of Europe have to 
ratify the Convention (Council of Europe, 1950). In addition to this the 1948 UN Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights similarly proclaims the protection of privacy (United Nations, 
1948). 
Data privacy legislation has become a topic of legal discussion since the 1960s with the 
introduction of electronic personal data collection and processing technologies. Where the 
right to privacy protected the individual’s freedom to be left alone, the right to data privacy is 
resulting from the increased loss of control of the individual over its own information and the 
power asymmetry between the individual and the data controller (Hijmans, 2016, p. 48). The 
first data privacy legislation of the world was adopted by the German State of Hessen in 1970. 
Shortly thereafter, in 1973, Sweden was the first country to adopt its own data privacy 
legislation. Both these countries already then adopted comprehensive data privacy bills. In 
contrast to this approach, the United States adopted in the same year the “Fair Information 
Practices” (FIPS), which only mandated broad guidelines for governmental information 
processors, but no general right to data privacy. This approach has been adopted in many 
countries outside the United Sates (Tikkinen-Piri, Rohunen, & Markkula, 2018).  
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3.3 Data Protection as a fundamental right 
Today, the right to privacy and the right to data protection are protected as fundamental 
rights in the legal order of the European Union, both by the Treaty on the Functioning of the 
European Union (TFEU) and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union 
(Charter).  
As fundamental rights, in Europe the right to privacy and data protection are both seen as 
“civil and political rights and as a reflecting human dignity” (Hijmans, 2016, p. 62). A common 
theme among professionals and researchers in the field can be observed in their description 
of the rights' purpose to not let individuals be reduced to just a data point, to not be something 
less than an individual, to having a unique value (Hustinx, 2013, p.1). Mireille Hildebrandt has 
eloquently elevated this understanding describing the purpose of privacy as “protecting what 
is uncountable, incalculable or incomputable” (Hildebrandt, 2017, p.1). Her discourse is 
influenced by the most recent developments in computer science, where computer systems 
are able to, to some degree, simulate human intelligence meaning they form artificial 
intelligence (AI). The technology known as machine learning (ML) differs from traditional 
computer systems in that it is not programmed by humans. In traditional computer systems 
every response is in some degree pre-programmed by a human. Machine learning uses vast 
amount of data to develop an understanding for patterns and has the ability for inexact 
reasoning even with incomplete, uncertain or fuzzy data (Negnevitsky, 2005).  
Example 3 
A popular example is machine learning being able to reliably differentiate between a female 
face and a male face after having been fed thousands of pictures of either. The issue with 
machine learning becomes visible by this example, as it is still bound to the quality of data 
and categories it was trained on. Machine leaning is increasingly used for automated decision 
making, where it is becoming more and more usual to make decisions that were, in the past, 
made by humans. But machine learning is also inheriting issues - issues of biases inherited 
from data, which is based on human thinking, are increasingly appearing. For example, 
machines today are used to predict if convicted criminals will be able to re-socialise, 
determining their handling by the court. For this the machine is profiling the convicted and 
makes a recommendation that judges tend to follow. Researchers found out though that the 
machine was reproducing established biases towards people of colour and therefore was 
giving more negative predictions for that ethnic group than for other ethnic groups (Rieland, 
2018).  
People often trust the conclusions of machines as “objective” and therefore tend to scrutinise 
it less intensely. This shows why automated decision-making bears great risks. For this 
reason, automated decision making has been restricted in European data protection laws, so 
that individuals can object to being subject to it. Hildebrandt sees the risks for the individual 
and society inherent to these technological developments and therefore, as other authors 
have too, theorises private data to be removed from these systems, so that there remains an 
“incomputable” self (Hildebrandt, 2017, p. 9). 
While Europe is certainly the frontrunner when it comes to establishing privacy as a 
fundamental right, there are indications that other countries and regions are increasingly 
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embracing the European thinking on this question. For example, on 24 August 2017 the 
Indian Supreme Court ruled that privacy is a fundamental right per the constitution of India. 
It cited a familiar reasoning “the preservation of personal intimacies, the sanctity of family 
life, marriage, procreation, the home and sexual orientation. Privacy also connotes a right to 
be left alone". The case related to the collection of biometric data, a category of data that 
cannot be processed under normal circumstances under European law but has come under 
increasing pressure to be used for various purposes such as security or profiling. The Indian 
Supreme Court has recognised this development, saying “technological change has given rise 
to concerns which were not present seven decades ago” (Figarella, 2017). The right to privacy 
is also recognised in the Brazilian, Jamaica, Mexican, Nigerian, the Philippian and South 
African constitutions (Privacy International, 2018). After the publication of the Cambridge 
Analytica scandal, even in the United States calls for a comprehensive data protection law 
became louder, with some congressmen suggesting to adopt GDPR-style legislation during a 
hearing of Facebook boss Mark Zuckerberg (Hautala, 2018). 
3.4 Frameworks 
3.4.1 Overview of data privacy regimes 
See table 17, for an overview of the data protection regimes with international reach used in 
this thesis. See the annex for an overview of the presence of specific principles in the 
frameworks. 
The UN also has developed privacy guidelines but since they have little to no influence in the 
world they have not been included here (Bygrave, 2014, 51ff.). 
3.4.2 Council of Europe Convention 108 
The Council of Europe Convention 108 is, in terms of its content, very similar to the OECD 
guidelines (see next section), as they were created in cooperation with each other, 
concurrently. While the Council of Europe Convention is more concerned with fleshing out 
Article 8 of the ECHR, the OECD guidelines take a more economic view, emphasising the 
importance of data for economic development. The Convention is a multilateral treaty, 
meaning it is binding, but only when countries accede to it. As of time of writing 46 of 47 
Council of Europe members have ratified the Convention. EU accession is technically possible 
since 1999, but not yet in force (Bygrave, 2014, p. 32, 44). 
The core principles can be reviewed in the annex, in table 18. As the Convention, together 
with the OECD guidelines were the first of its kind, all these principles were new and today 
form the basis of many data protection laws. Itself, it was mostly influenced by the emerging 
national data protection legislation in Sweden, Germany and Belgium of the early and mid 
1970s. In 2001, an Additional Protocol was added to the Convention, giving it more detailed 
rules on transborder data flows and data protection authority role (Bygrave, 2014, p. 32f.). 
Since 2012 it was attempted to modernise the Convention, but this has failed due to 
resistance of Russia, as all signees need to agree. For this reason, the Convention 
Consultative Committee has decided to pursue the creation of a new, more robust 
Convention, to which all countries have to accede anew. 
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In regard to its own influence, the Convention always had an implicit global aspiration: 
Council of Europe members can invite non-members to accede, but this option had not been 
made use of. In 2005 the global conference of Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners 
called on the CoE to “invite, in accordance with article 23 […] non-member-states […] to 
accede to this Convention” (Data Protection and Privacy Commissioners, 2005) and in 
reaction to this the Convention Committee suggested in March 2008 to the member states to 
allow accession requests by non-members, which the member states followed, making it an 
open convention. In 2009 the EU in its Stockholm programme called on the Council of Europe 
to promote the Convention worldwide, demonstrating also the similarities to the EU standard. 
Uruguay has been the first beneficiary of this new procedure, in 2011 (Greenleaf, 2012). As 
of writing, nine non-members have been invited to accede to the Convention: Argentina, 
Burkina Faso, Cabo Verde, Mauritius, Mexico, Morocco, Senegal, Tunisia and the 
aforementioned Uruguay. It is apparent that only Mexico and Argentina can be regarded as 
major economies, as they hold position 15 and 21 in the global GDP rankings per the United 
Nations, respectively, (United Nations, 2017) and the other countries have a relatively small 
weight in the global economic system. Due to the small number and limited economic weight 
of states, the influence on their accession to the Convention to the global regulatory system 
can be regarded as having a symbolic rather than a real economic impact. 
3.4.3 OECD guidelines 
As mentioned, the OECD has developed its own data protection framework in close 
cooperation with the Council of Europe but arrived at somewhat different results. The 
guidelines are more business-friendly, as countries should avoid “unjustified obstacles to 
transborder data flows”, that according to the head of the expert group, who drafted the 
guidelines could results in “a cacophony of laws, which did little to advance human rights”. 
In addition to this the guidelines are non-binding for OECD member countries. The present 
principles can again be taken from table 18, but what can be said is that while similar to the 
Convention 108, it is omitting some important protections and rights and can therefore be 
regarded as the laxer framework. The guidelines were revised in 2013, after an extensive 
assessment, but the eight principles and its non-binding nature remained essentially 
unchanged. The only noteworthy change is the addition of a recommendation to establish 
“privacy enforcement authorities”, similar to the additional protocol of the Convention and 
the EU Directive (OECD, 2013). While the Convention has been very influential in Europe, the 
OECD guidelines have been more influential in other parts of the world, particularly in 
countries bordering the Pacific ocean up until the 2000s and has been touted to have had a 
significant influence on the APEC Privacy Framework of 2005 (Birnhack, 2008, p. 6; Bygrave, 
2014, p. 44ff.; OECD, 1980).  
3.4.4 EU Directive 95 
In 1995 the EU passed a Directive on data protection and although the Commission seems 
to have also been driven by a desire to protect fundamental rights, it has, similar to the OECD 
Guidelines, mainly tried to prevent contradictory national data protection laws, which would 
have had negative consequences on the internal market. The Directive has though spearhead 
a development of incorporating human rights into the EU legal system, being the first 
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directive to expressly be based on the protection of human rights. (Bygrave, 2014, p. 57). 
These two aspects neatly demonstrate that the Directive is caught between the protection of 
the right to privacy and the ongoing process of realising the single market. As was noted 
before, the EU supported and supports the Convention 108, but as it had not gained many 
accessions by the early 1990s, the Commission decided to start work on a binding legal act 
for the EU (Bygrave, 2014, p. 55).  
In terms of its content, the Directive is visibly based on the Convention 108, but goes beyond 
it in multiple areas. In its recitals (legislative notes that contextualise the act’s articles) the 
Directive makes a direct reference to Convention 108 and sets out to “amplify” it (European 
Union, 1995). Details in regard to the principles of the Directive can be viewed in table 18.  
The Directive introduced the adequacy decision system, which was continued by the 
replacement Regulation GDPR. The adequacy system essentially requires countries that 
want to be able to receive personal data concerning EU citizens to adopt data protection laws 
at least “adequate” to the EU standard (Birnhack, 2008, p. 9; European Union, 1995). In this, 
an adequacy decision can be a major competitive advantage for a country, as only then cross-
border processing of EU personal data can be done legally. Not having an adequacy decision 
can lead to companies not choosing to be based in the given country. In this, the system has 
also been described as a relatively aggressive measure (Birnhack, 2008, p. 3). Until the in 
force of the replacement, the GDPR, the Directive was clearly the most stringent and 
restrictive data protection framework in the world. 
While the Directive 95 has certainly had some influence, Bennett notes that “nowhere has 
the Data Protection Directive been the sole reason for another country’s passing a data 
protection law” (Bennett 1997, 2001 as cited by: Birnhack, 2008, p. 13). The adequacy 
decision has certainly resulted in some level of adoption of similar rules, as countries which 
want to do serious trade with the European Union need to obtain an adequacy decision from 
the European Commission, that their data protection law provides a comparative level of 
protection as the European one. According to Birnhacker, countries that have adopted 
legislation aspiring to approach the Directive are: Australia, Argentina, Hong-Kong, Israel, 
Japan, South Africa, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Uruguay and New Zealand. Of these only 
Argentina, Israel, Switzerland and Uruguay actually managed to obtain an adequacy decision 
from the Commission. Notably, the United States obtained a quasi-adequacy decision from 
the Commission based only on self-certification of US companies, showing that economic 
weight also plays a factor (Birnhack, 2008, p. 15). 
3.4.5 APEC Privacy Framework 
APEC is an Asia-Pacific regional economic forum with 21 members, including most bigger 
countries in the area, established to promote growth and wealth creation. These states 
adopted an own framework in 2003. Bygrave notes the difference in motivation in relation to 
the EU approach. While the Directive had a dual-purpose: the protection of privacy and 
enabling the single market, the APEC guideline „appears to foster data privacy regimes less 
because of [a] desire to protect basic human rights than to endanger consumer confidence in 
business“ (Bygrave, 2014, p. 75), no mention is being made of privacy as a fundamental right. 
It therefore makes sense that the APEC guidelines state its core principles coming from the 
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less-strict OECD guidelines and not the Convention 108 or EU Directive (Asia Pacific 
Economic Cooperation, 2005, p. 3) and that the standard is not legally binding.  
The principles can be viewed in table 18. It is apparent from that view that the framework is 
by far not as restrictive as the European approaches to data protection. The framework is 
mostly picking up a subset of not-too-invasive principles from OECD and European data 
protection law and has been dubbed “OECD lite” (Bygrave, 2014, p. 77). New is a “preventing 
harm” principle, of which the consequences remain unclear though. The APEC countries 
revised their 2005 guidelines in 2015. While the previous guidelines were based on the 1980 
OECD guidelines, the 2015 revision is itself based on the 2013 revision of the OECD 
guidelines. As the OECD system was barely touched in its revision, the APEC Guidelines can 
be seen as a continuation of the 2005 rules (Birnhack, 2008, p. 8; Bygrave, 2014, p. 78ff.; 
Greenleaf, 2009, p. 8). 
In terms of the influence of the Guidelines, Asian data protection law expert Graham 
Greenleaf (2009) takes a critical position. As the law is non-binding and its provisions only “a 
floor, not a ceiling”, they had no influence on countries in the region that already had data 
protection laws, as they usually provided at least the same level of protection. Countries that 
were developing new laws were said to orient themselves more toward the higher European 
standard and the APEC Guidelines therefore represent “a floor on which no one seems to be 
dancing” (Greenleaf, 2009, p. 7) 
3.4.6 ECOWAS Supplementary Act 
In similar fashion as in the Pacific region, data protection is being led by a regional body in 
Africa. The 15 members strong Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has 
adopted a “Supplementary Act on Personal Data Protection” to its main treaty in 2010, 
making it a legally binding part of membership. As opposed to the APEC framework, the 
ECOWAS act is though not primarily concerned with economics, but is clearly rooted in “the 
promotion and protection of human and peoples’ rights” (ECOWAS, 2010). In this it is an 
instrument that shares many principles with the European frameworks (see table 18 for 
reference) and in some areas, such as automated decision making is even going further than 
the European ones. According to the NATO Cooperative Cyber Defence Centre of Excellence, 
the ECOWAS supplementary act has been strongly influenced by the EU Data Protection 
Directive (CCDCOE, n.d.). On the side of the ECOWAS act, it has influenced and spurred further 
development of data privacy regulation in Africa, as a reaction the African Union has drafted 
a cyber security and data privacy convention for the continent, but the ECOWAS 
Supplementary Act had little to no influence outside of Africa (Makulilo, 2016, p. 377). 
3.4.7 GDPR 
The replacement of the EU Directive 95, the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) will 
result in a harmonised data protection standard in the EU. This means that a market of 500 
million citizens (the UK has already committed to the standard for after Brexit) will be covered 
by the same set of rules, with some smaller possibilities for national customisation. The GDPR 
is clearly continuing in the footsteps of the Directive but adopting them in the face of changed 
data processing in the age of big data. Many principles have been adapted to be more robust 
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or stringent and the Regulation is more restrictive in general in terms of data processing. For 
the principles, see table 18. The GDPR probably represents the strictest data protection law 
in the world and is based on an understanding of data protection that seems unique to 
Europe. It expands the basic rules of the Directive to give them applicability and 
enforceability. Continuing and strengthening the Adequacy decision system, a company 
offering services in the EU, even if not situated in the EU, or offering online services only must 
abide by the rules and therefore the GDPR is exerting a sort of extraterritorial jurisdiction. 
The influence of the GDPR is difficult to ascertain, as it is in the process of becoming 
applicable, but it has certainly caught the attention of regulators and companies worldwide 
and has been described as everything from a hype to craze (Lahiri, 2018; Rowntree, 2017). 
One of the main aims of this thesis is evaluating the degree of the influence the GDPR has had 
on the world. 
3.4.8 The US framework 
The United States has a “patch-work” of sectoral or type-specific laws, covering only 
sensitive information and no single, comprehensive federal law. Protected is only very 
specific health information via the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act 
(HIPAA) of 1996, some protection in the ICT sector via the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act 
(CFAA) of 1986 and the Cybersecurity Information Act of 2015 and in finance with the Bank 
Secrecy Act of 1970 (BSA). No single data protection regulatory authority exists, even though 
the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) has used some of its executive powers to enforce 
privacy rights. Data protection in the European sense only exists for children under the age of 
fourteen with the Children’s Online Privacy Protection Act (COPPA) (O’Connor, 2018). In 
addition to this, the United States has a myriad of state level legislation for any number of 
sectors (Safari, 2017). Lastly also the Privacy Act of 1974 exists, but only covers a limited 
scope in the public sector (United States, 1974). Since there is no single and comprehensive 
law giving rights to the general public, the United States are coded to not possess a data 
protection law and are therefore not represented in table 18. 
This patch-work has resulted in multiple data breaches in the US being insufficiently handled, 
as no legal obligation exists. Companies like Uber have attempted to hide a data breach by 
for example trying to buy the data off the black market, while still being investigated for 
another data breach. No fines have been imposed (Bloomberg, 2018). Other companies, like 
credit rating company Equifax, have lost essentially all their customer data to hackers and 
have waited punishably long to disclose a breach, robbing users of the possibility to immunise 
themselves against the misuse of data (Fung, 2018). Based on these developments and as 
has been noted, the United States is today closer to ever to actually adopt a comprehensive 
data protection law. 
_____ 
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4 Research design and data 
This chapter’s purpose is to explain to the reader what the two research questions are 
and how they will be answered. It will explain how data from data protection 
authorities was gathered to answer the first research question and how the second 
research question will be answered as a synthesis of the all the previously gathered 
information. 
_____ 
4.1 Research questions 
Drezner and Bradford both believe in states shaping the conditions for a standard to emerge 
as the global standard, but don’t believe in the same causes and conditions. Both authors use 
data protection as an example to prove their theory and by doing this, they also make it a 
crucial case study for their theory. If the theory does not hold up for this example, that is after 
all chosen by the author him- and herself, the validity of this theory has to be seriously called 
into question (George & Bennett, 2005, p. 33). They cannot both be right; therefore, data 
protection is an optimal choice for a case study.  
Drezner and Bradford both use data protection as an example for proving their theory, but 
they use it to opposite ends. Drezner uses data protection to prove that neither of the big 
powers (the EU and the US) has managed to establish a standard in opposition to the other, 
meaning that no global standard has emerged or can emerge. Bradford uses it to prove that 
fulfilling her conditions can lead to exactly the opposite, meaning that a global standard does 
emerge. To say it simply: Something has to give. 
But before getting into that, the data I generate will first help to answer a less theoretical and 
more practical question: 
RQ1. Is global regulatory convergence happening in the field of data protection 
regulation? 
This question has two sub-questions: Firstly, whether any data protection standard at all is 
emerging as the dominant standard in the world; and secondly, whether the European Union 
is successful in establishing their standard, a popular assumption in policy circles. 
As for the conditions and causes for regulatory convergence, both Drezner and Bradford 
agree on market power being paramount, but only Drezner assigns an important role to 
NGOs/IGOs. Meanwhile Bradford has four other further conditions (regulatory capacity, 
preference for strict rules, predisposition to regulate inelastic markets, non-divisibility of 
standards). In chapter 2, I have shed some light on where they agree, where they are in 
conflict and why. In what follows I aim, using the data I generated for my case and combining 
it with the academic writing in the field, to generate some clarity about which of their 
conditions are actually important and applicable and which new ones can be added. 
Therefore, my second research question is:  
RQ2. What are the conditions for global regulatory convergence, based on the 
example of data protection regulation? 
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4.2 Is there convergence in data protection regulation? 
To answer the first research question, I will analyse the prevalence of different data 
protection principles in the world’s data protection legislation. For this I have identified the 
principles of the nine most influential data protection frameworks (see table 18 in the 
appendix). There are five influential intergovernmental organisations that have developed 
their own privacy frameworks. The OECD, the Council of Europe, the EU, APEC and ECOWAS 
all have one. The UN also has its own, very similar to the OECD standard, but it has never 
gained much influence in the world (Bygrave 2014). Most of these frameworks have 
undergone revisions, and I have therefore identified a total of nine versions of these 
frameworks (see table 6 for an overview).  
I have gone through these frameworks and with the help of additional secondary literature 
(mainly: Bygrave 2014; Tikkinen-Piri et al., 2018; de Hert & Papakonstantinou 2014; 
Greenleaf 2012; Hijmans 2016) identified the main principles of each framework. I did this 
in a chronological way, starting from the oldest and working my way up to the newest. Doing 
this I arrived at the principles described in table 18, which shows which principles are 
reflected in which privacy framework. The next step was to then collect data on which data 
protection principles are reflected in the world's data protection legislation. For this purpose, 
I have created an online questionnaire, asking data protection authorities to fill out which 
principle is present in their law or whether there is a law at all.  
Asking data from data protection authorities ensures that the information one receives is 
reliable, as these authorities are the foremost experts on the legislation in their country. The 
data protection authorities were identified based on a multitude of structured and 
unstructured resources. The main resources, besides desktop research for the authorities on 
governments websites were: Asia Pacific Privacy Authorities, 2018; BakerHostetler, 2016; 
DLA Piper, 2016; Greenleaf, 2017; International Association of Privacy Professionals, 2018; 
International Conference of Data Protection & Privacy Commissioners, 2017; United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development, 2017.  
To collect the data, the questionnaires were sent to the authorities via email, some 
authorities were also called to increase the response rate. Since the response rate to the 
email survey was quite low and the extensive amount of work required to get replies from 
data protection authorities (over 500 emails were sent, around 25 calls to authorities 
resulted in a few additional completed surveys), desk research was employed to complete 
some unfinished questionnaires. For this the law itself and secondary literature was 
employed (BakerHostetler, 2016; DLA Piper, 2016), to ensure the data is reliable. Through 
this the data protection legislation (or lack thereof) of a total count of 26 countries could be 
analysed (see table 7). 
The last step was to analyse the amount of times the principles of each framework were 
represented in the data that was gained. As I had data on where each principle has its origin, 
I was able to make inferences on which of the frameworks are dominant in the world. To 
make these inferences, I used the analytical framework provided by Holzninger & Knill 
introduced in chapter 2. 
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4.3 What are the conditions for convergence? 
To answer the second research question, I will take the theoretical information I gained in 
chapters two and three and confront it with the data collected through the questionnaire. 
There is a simple and a more complex approach to this 
question.  
The simple approach is to just answer who of the two 
authors is right and who is wrong. Looking alone at how 
Drezner and Bradford structure their theories, they 
immediately disagree whether convergence could happen in 
data protection. Drezner says it cannot happen, as the US 
and the European Union disagree on the topic and therefore, 
according to his theory, there cannot be a global standard. 
Bradford, on the other hand, says it is happening, because 
the EU as an institution fulfils all the necessary conditions 
that she sets. As mentioned before, one of them has to be 
wrong.  
The more complex approach to the research question is to 
find which causes and conditions actually are required for 
regulatory convergence to happen and which ones are not 
relevant. To be able to answer this question, all previous 
findings will be employed. This means both authors theories, 
the information on the data protection frameworks, the 
conclusion on the first research question, both authors 
writings on the application of their theory on the data 
protection case and further contextual information. 
4.4 Sample 
Through the questionnaire, 26 answers were received (see 
table on the right). Out of that number, 15 questionnaires 
were completed by data protection authorities, 4 by 
information commissioners, 2 by government ministries, 1 
from a National CSIRT (National Computer Security Incident 
Response Team, an agency that is in charge of handling data 
breaches, among other things). 4 replies were started by 
authorities but not finished; for these I have completed the 
questionnaire using the law text and secondary literature. 
Respondents answered for their own country. 12 answers 
are from non-EU European countries. EU countries were not 
surveyed as the GDPR is replacing all national legislation and 
the GDPR was already analysed as one of the privacy 
Table 6: Questionnaire replies 
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frameworks. 7 replies were from African countries, 5 from American and 2 from Asian 
countries. 
Out of the respondent countries, 20 have a single comprehensive data protection law, which 
the answers were based on. 3 countries have a draft law, 2 of which have no existing law and 
1 is in the process of recasting the country’s existing law. 2 have no single comprehensive 
law, but multiple laws covering different sectors. Finally, 1 respondent country has no law at 
all and therefore no data protection framework. 
From the countries with laws, 2 adopted their laws in the 1980s, 1 in the 1990s, 11 in the 
2000s and 9 in the 2010s. 
Apart from asking respondents on what data protection principles are present in their 
legislation, they were also asked if their country either has, is in the process of or is planning 
to amend their legislation in response to the adoption by the EU of the GDPR. This question 
was replied to in the positive by 21 respondents and negatively by 5, which means the 
countries that are amending their legislation in response to the GDPR is more than 5 times 
higher than that of those who do not. Countries in Europe and Africa almost all replied that 
they would amend their legislation, with only 1 country per region answering that they would 
not. Both Asian countries replied they would amend their legislation. On the other hand, in 
the Americas 3 out of 5 countries replied that they would not be amending their legislation. 
Before delving in-depth into the actual data protection principles, I want to contextualise the 
questionnaire data and consider its relation to the more general data set. As mentioned 
before, I used desk research to collect information on countries' data protection laws and 
data protection authorities around the world. This data can be inspected in table 19 in the 
appendix. 
 
Table 7: Existence of data protection laws by region 
Africa Americas Asia EU Europe (ex EU) Oceania
Yes 23 23 23 31 23 2
Draft 4 7 2
No 29 11 17 12
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Comparing the questionnaire sample with the whole set of data protection laws in the world, 
it is clear that non-EU European countries are overrepresented, while Asia is 
underrepresented. Oceania does not feature in the sample, but only two laws exist in this 
area (Australia and New Zealand). 
There is no European country without a data protection law, proving the continent's 
spearheading of the policy field. The 28 EU countries have had a constant stream of new laws 
since the early 1970s, with many Central and Eastern European countries adopting legislation 
after the 1990s. The last EU countries to adopt such legislation are Estonia and Croatia, in 
2003. The non-EU countries generally started to adopt legislation at a later time and with less 
speed, though they kicked up the pace in the 2000s. Turkey was the last to adopt data 
protection legislation, in 2016. 
The Americas and Asia have been on a largely coupled trajectory, only starting to adopt 
legislation on a wider scale in the 2000s, with both regions now roughly split between 
countries having legislation and countries having none. Since 7 countries in the Americas are 
now discussing a draft law, it can be expected that a significant amount of countries in the 
Americas will adopt data protection legislation in the near future.  
 
Table 8: Development of data protection laws by region 
African countries were the last to begin the adoption process, also in the 2000s, but their 
continent has seen a constant output of legislation since then, now almost reaching parity in 
terms of number of countries with laws and number of countries without. Australia and New 
Zealand adopted their data protection legislation quite early, but none of the island states in 
Oceania have followed them. 
 When it comes to the presence of a data protection authority, a key principle of European 
data protection law, European countries are again leading the pack with only 2 countries 
having none. Africa, Asia and the Americas all have 6 to 9 countries that have legislation, but 
no data protection agencies. Due to the unclear situation for some countries, again mainly in  
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 Africa, Asia and the Americas, for some countries 
the presence of data protection authorities is 
marked as “unknown”. This is the case where data 
protection legislation exists and actually demands 
a data protection authority, but no such authority 
could be identified. In these cases, the authority 
might not have been established yet, or does not 
have much or any information available to the 
public. In Oceania all countries that have data 
protection legislation have appointed an authority 
for it.  
4.5 Limitations of the sample  
Due the low response rate, the sample size is 
relatively low, at 26 responses. I argue that this is still sufficient to draw meaningful 
inferences, as it does represent one fifth of the world's data protection legislation and every 
respondent answered over forty questions, making it possible to group questions to make the 
data basis more robust. The results are quite clear, helping to make them credible, still, a 
higher sample size would have made the results more reliable.  
Related to the sample size is the issue of making inferences about the temporal development 
of policy convergence in data protection. Firstly, looking at the development of legislation on 
a year-by-year basis does not seem to be fruitful, as not every year sees the introduction of 
new legislation. This issue can be mitigated by grouping the years to create intervals. A 
second temporal issue is due to the way some respondents answered the questionnaire. 
Authorities in almost all cases answered it based on either the most recent version of the law 
or a current draft. While four respondents also indicated years of revision for individual 
principles (i.e. the year when the principle was added), most did not. This means that 
legislation data skewers clearly to more recent years, making the data more reliable from the 
2010s, consequently meaning also that inferences from there on are relatively reliable. 
_____ 
Region Yes No Unknown 
Africa 17 34 5 
Americas 16 17 8 
Asia 13 22 7 
EU 31   
Europe (excl. EU) 20 2 1 
Oceania 2 12  
Total 99 87 21 
Table 9: Existence of data protection authority 
by region 
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5 Is there convergence in data protection regulation? 
This chapter’s purpose is to answer the first research question if there is convergence 
in data protection regulation. For this purpose, the data gathered form data protection 
authorities will be analysed by employing the analytical framework from Holzninger 
and Knill, introduced in chapter two. They use the indicators degree, direction and 
scope of convergence to determine whether convergence occurs and to what level. 
The wider purpose of this chapter is to use the answer to the first research question 
to be a part of the answer to the second research question. 
_____ 
Due to the sample count of 26 not falling authoritatively in the large-n territory, a purely 
quantitative assessment of the data as suggested by Holzninger & Knill will be complemented 
by a qualitative contextualisation. 
To turn the answers from the questionnaire into quantitative data, the yes/no answers for 
each principle and law have been coded into 1 and 0 values, arriving at a total of 975 data 
points describing whether a specific principle is present in a specific legislation. For each 
legislation the point of adoption by the country has been used to make inferences about the 
temporal development in the field. The following data is always based only on the laws 
adopted in the given years and not on accumulating laws. 
Indicator Research question Operationalisation 
Degree of 
convergence 
To what degree have policies become 
more similar? 
Decrease in standard 
deviation over time 
Convergence 
direction 
In what direction (strict or lenient) have 
policies developed? 
Mean change 
Convergence 
scope 
Which (groups of) countries are converging 
in which direction? 
Number of countries and 
policies 
Table 10: Reminder: indicators by Holzninger & Knill 
5.1 Degree of convergence 
Assessing the degree of convergence means figuring out whether different legislations have 
become more similar or dissimilar to each other. Holzninger & Knill suggest measuring the 
decrease in standard deviation over time. Standard deviation helps to identify how much 
variation exists in a dataset. A high value indicates a high degree of divergence and an 
increasing value indicates a rising degree of divergence. A low value indicates a high degree of 
convergence and a falling value indicates a rising degree of convergence. As the data has been 
coded into 1 and 0 answers, the result will be a number between those values. 
To measure development over time, the legislations have been grouped into five-year 
intervals, based on the year of adoption of the law or the revision of the law. Then the 
standard deviation has been measured for each group and compared to the total mean. 
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Holzninger & Knill actually suggest measuring each group internally, but I argue that it makes 
more sense to compare the deviation from the total, as this will say more about whether 
legislation is converging on one standard than looking at whether convergence is happening 
toward the mean of the interval, meaning whether legislation is particularly similar in that 
timeframe only. 
Interval 
1995 – 
1999 
2000 - 
2004 
2005 – 
2009 
2010 – 
2014 
2015 - 
2019 
Standard 
deviation 
0,454 0,394 0,263 0,304 0,146 
Table 11: Standard deviation per year-group 
There is a clear and constant trend toward more similar laws. While legislation in the first two 
groups (1995 – 2004) are essentially only little more than half alike, the last group (2015-
2019) is almost approaching uniform characteristics. There is a strong downward blip in the 
2005 – 2009 group: This group is composed exclusively of African countries, which compared 
to the data of the complete sample tend to adopt strict legislation. While this is in line with 
the general direction of legislation (see next section), African countries have adopted such 
legislation earlier than the rest of the sample and therefore converged earlier. 
5.2 Convergence direction 
As it is clear now that convergence is happening, and laws are therefore becoming more 
similar, the next step is to assess in which direction of convergence the laws have developed. 
This will show if legislation is becoming stricter or more lenient. To measure this, the 
prevalence of the data protection principles in legislation will be utilised. As all but one of the 
principles are giving either a right to consumers or putting an obligation on data controllers, 
the inclusion of a principle can be regarded as a step toward a stricter regime. Conversely, 
the exclusion of a principle is then to be considered as a step toward a more lenient regime. 
To measure development over time, legislation has been divided into the same intervals as 
before. 
Interval 
1995 – 
 1999 
2000 – 
 2004 
2005 – 
 2009 
2010 – 
 2014 
2015 – 
 2019 
% of strict 
principles present 
28% 57% 77% 69% 86% 
Table 12: Prevalence of data protection principles 
The results are again clear and show a continuing trend toward stricter legislation over the 
years. While the first interval is quite extreme, possibly an outlier, it is evident even when 
disregarding the first interval that regulation has become stricter, with recent legislation 
incorporating almost all possible principles of data protection. The 2005 – 2009 group is 
again showing a blip, which has to attributed to the strict African laws of this group.  
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With reference to table 18, it is relevant to point out here that the EU GPDR features all but 
two principles from the total list of identified principles. 
5.3 Convergence scope 
Convergence scope determines which countries and policies are actually converging toward 
a common standard. To answer this question, both the sample from the questionnaire and 
the data set covering all countries are relevant. As data protection is a new policy field, having 
a law at all is already an endorsement for data protection as a civil right. In chapter 4, it 
became evident that many countries have made the choice to adopt data protection 
legislation in the last 50 years. In 2012 the number of countries having adopted legislation 
overtook the number of countries without and as of writing, countries with legislation lead 
countries without by a number of 43. It would therefore seem the trend is not yet slowing 
down. This means 125 countries in the world are falling under the convergence scope of 
making the decision to adopt legislation. 
 
Table 13: Development of data protection laws 
Analysing all of those 125 countries exceeds the scope of this thesis, but based on the sample 
some inferences can be made. For this, in the next section, more focus will be on affected 
regions than on temporal factors. Chapter 4.5 already showed which regions have adopted 
data protection legislation and to what degree, with Europe being at the forefront and the 
Americas, Asia and Africa all following at a similar pace. 
5.4 Is the European standard emerging as the global standard? 
Assessing the prevalence of data protection legislation by region offers the opportunity to 
move on to the second sub-question: Is the European standard emerging as the global 
standard? To answer this question, I have matched every principle from each of the 
frameworks with the corresponding principle in all the respondents’ legislation. That is, for 
each principle in the law, an algorithm checked whether that principle was set to the same 
status in each of the frameworks. Where it matched (meaning either both were set to yes or 
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both were set to no, the absence of a principle in both is a match too) a match point was given; 
where it did not, none was given. After these 9.360 calculations, the results were divided by 
the amount of principles for each law and framework, arriving at a percentage, which shows 
to which degree each law and each framework are alike, meaning the degree of convergence 
on the different frameworks. In what follows I will inspect the result of this process. 
First, from a regional point of view, considerable divergence in affiliation to frameworks 
emerge. The following table show to what percentage the countries' legislation, grouped by 
regions, matches the different frameworks. The cells have been coloured to help identify 
where there is a high match (green) and where there is a low match (red). 
 
Region 
 
OECD 
(1980) 
CoE 108 
(1981) 
Directive 
(1995) 
CoE 108 
(2001) 
APEC 
(2005) 
ECOWAS 
(2010) 
OECD 
(2013) 
APEC 
(2015) 
GDPR 
(2016) 
Africa 40% 52% 66% 58% 43% 61% 42% 43% 76% 
Americas 47% 61% 61% 64% 47% 61% 49% 47% 65% 
Asia 39% 53% 61% 53% 47% 56% 39% 47% 72% 
Europe (excl. EU) 47% 63% 74% 69% 53% 70% 46% 53% 66% 
Table 14: Match percentages per region and framework 
The African laws are quite closely aligned to the European frameworks, especially to the EU 
legislation and already match the recently adopted GDPR quite well. The GDPR legislative 
process lasted over seven years and it is therefore not unlikely that it already emanated some 
influence before adoption in 2016, especially considering that the Commission proposal went 
public in 2012. Much fewer similarities exist with the more lenient OECD and APEC 
guidelines, meaning that the African laws go further than those lenient frameworks (as 
mentioned, a match point is only given when law and framework match up, even when the 
law is stricter). Interestingly, the African countries share more commonalities with the 
European standards than with the African ECOWAS protocol. This can be explained by most 
African countries in the sample adopting stricter legislation than is required by the ECOWAS 
protocol. 
Legislation form the American countries is the least clearly-aligned, staying inside a roughly 
20%-wide range between 47%-65% matching for all of the frameworks. Scores for the 
European frameworks as well as the African ECOWAS (which matches the Directive relatively 
closely, see table 18 in the annex for reference) are all in the low to mid 60% area, while all 
the other (lenient) frameworks are in the high 40% values. 
The data on Asian legislation, having a sample count of only two countries, is not be as reliable 
as that on the other regions. Nonetheless, the sample shows a similar if less slightly less 
pronounced picture to the one from the African countries, with a relative dominance of the 
EU standard. Interestingly, there is relatively little common ground with the APEC guidelines, 
with less than 50% of the laws and framework matching up. This confirms other authors' 
views about the APEC framework only representing a baseline. 
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Lastly, the European countries are closely aligned with the EU directive, with a 74% match. 
Given the proximity to the EU and its multiple association agreements with non-EU European 
countries, this is not very surprising. The Council of Europe and ECOWAS frameworks also 
match with around 70%, with the GDPR closely behind, but not (yet) in first or second place. 
The OECD and APEC frameworks don’t seem to be very influential, barely exceeding the 50% 
mark. 
This data shows that the European data protection framework is the most prevalent one in 
all sampled regions in the world, even though it's not necessarily dominant in all regions and 
especially not in the Americas. African countries in particular seem to adopt legislation that 
is quite similar to EU legislation and while the data suggests Asian countries are doing the 
same, it is difficult to draw reliable inferences from two samples. The non-EU European 
countries are closely aligned with EU legislation.  
To completely answer the question whether the European standard is emerging as the global 
standard, it is necessary to also identify the direction of convergence on a framework-basis. 
For this, the previously used year-intervals return, to be able to assess the temporal 
development.  
The following table show to what percentage the countries' legislation, grouped by year-
intervals, matches the frameworks. The cells have been coloured to help identify where there 
is a high match (green) and where there is a low match (red). 
Interval OECD (1980) 
CoE 108 
(1981) 
Directive 
(1995) 
CoE 108 
(2001) 
APEC 
(2005) 
ECOWAS 
(2010) 
OECD 
(2013) 
APEC 
(2015) 
GDPR 
(2016) 
1995-1999 72% 78% 53% 69% 67% 56% 67% 67% 33% 
2000-2004 56% 74% 76% 76% 63% 76% 54% 63% 56% 
2005-2009 42% 51% 69% 59% 45% 64% 42% 45% 75% 
2010-2014 47% 61% 72% 67% 52% 69% 46% 52% 67% 
2015-2019 35% 50% 64% 57% 38% 59% 38% 38% 79% 
Mean 46% 60% 69% 65% 50% 66% 46% 50% 68% 
Table 15: Match percentages per interval and frameworks 
Systematising the data, three phases of data protection law seem to exist. The first is the 
decreasing prevalence of laxer frameworks, such as the OECD and APEC guidelines and to 
some degree the original Council of Europe Convention 108. While legislation in the 90s and 
early 2000s seems to have been oriented around them and consequently has been quite lax, 
during the late 2000s and early 2010s these seem to have lost influence quite rapidly, with 
more robust regulation taking its place. 
The stricter frameworks, such as the 1995 EU Directive, the additional protocol to the Council 
of Europe Convention from 2001 and the ECOWAS protocol took over and seem to have been 
the most dominant in the 15-year period between 2000 and 2014 period. Most legislation 
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shows significant similarity to these frameworks, but with the most recent legislation this 
similarity has dropped considerably. 
Lastly and most recently, the age of the GDPR seems to have begun, as it is clearly the 
dominant framework in the most recent year bracket of 2015 to 2019, overshadowing all 
other frameworks. Within this interval match, a mean of 79% of the legislation adopted, or 
revised their laws according to, the characteristics of the GDPR. In particular the laxer 
frameworks seem to now have only little relevance left for legislators. 
After analysing the sample, the first research question – whether regulatory convergence is 
happening in the field of data protection – can likely be answered positively. Not only is, as a 
first step, convergence happening in terms of adopting data protection legislation at all, the 
legislation that has been adopted or has been revised is also becoming increasingly similar 
to each other and, crucial to this study, increasingly approaching the European Union 
standard. The sample size means some caution is necessary and it does not in itself allow 
any prediction of how legislation will evolve after this point, but it can be concluded that 
currently, the European data protection standard and especially characteristics of the new 
GDPR are being increasingly adopted by countries around the world. 
_____ 
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6 What are the conditions for convergence? 
The purpose of this section is to answer the second research question, namely what 
conditions have to be fulfilled for regulatory convergence to occur. For this, I will 
combine the theoretical frameworks of Drezner and Bradford from chapter 2, the 
information gained from the data protection frameworks in chapter 3 and the results 
of the questionnaire and analysis from chapters 4 and 5 to synthesise a reasoned 
argument about which conditions apply. This chapter will follow the same structure 
as the section on the conditions in chapter 2.2, for clarity. 
_____ 
As was discussed in chapter 4, both Drezner and Bradford discuss data protection as a case 
in their theory, but they are not basing their discussion on an own study into whether 
regulatory convergence is happening in this field, but on other authors' writings. In terms of 
the basis for making claims about regulatory convergence, this thesis is unique as no other 
study known to this author has conducted an investigation into data protection regulatory 
convergence by analysing how similar or dissimilar countries' legislation is both to each other 
and to the existing frameworks for this kind of legislation. This will allow me to make claims 
both Drezner and Bradford could not have made. 
Both authors firstly give an overview of how they see regulatory convergence in data 
protection. Drezner and Bradford take similar paths. Drezner says the US attitude “is based 
on freedom from state intervention”, while the European Union approaches privacy as a 
“fundamental right to be protected by the state” (Drezner, 2008, p. 104). In essence, the US 
prefers industry self-regulation, while the EU prefers stringent legislation. Bradford notes 
how the US and the EU have a fundamentally different relation to privacy, how in the EU the 
right to privacy cannot be “contracted away”. She makes the distinction between the EU and 
the US approach: The EU has comprehensive data protection legislation and enforcement 
agencies; the US has scattered sectoral laws and no uniform enforcement (Bradford, 2012, 
p. 22).  
For Drezner, in line with his previous prediction, there are two rival standards, the US and the 
EU approach to privacy, and he therefore expects that no global standard can emerge while 
the two great powers disagree. Opposed to this, Bradford theorises the global expansion of 
the European, comprehensive approach, that she purposes could even have an influence on 
the US itself. Here, she is going beyond Drezner, though it should be noted she does benefit 
from an additional four years of time passed (Bradford, 2012, p. 22). 
6.1 Market power - Can the EU establish a global standard against the US? 
As explained in chapter 2.3, Drezner has developed a systematisation of how great powers 
and other countries interact in terms of regulatory convergence (see table 5 for details). Since 
the US approach is to not have a single, comprehensive legislation, a country having such 
single, comprehensive legislation is already a win for the European standard. In 2008, at time 
of publication, countries having no data protection legislation still outnumbered countries 
with data protection legislation. According to my data, this would not constitute a rival 
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standard, as Drezner says, since such is characterised by “low conflict” between the other 
countries, but a sham standard, as the other countries are split (meaning there is conflict over 
this question not only between the great powers, but between the smaller powers too). If the 
smaller actors come to decidedly follow one of the two standards, as it is now increasingly 
happening, then it would become a rival standard. If one of the standards is becoming the 
de-facto standard in the world, while one of the powers has not adopted it, then it would not 
conform to the classification created by Drezner, as one of the great powers was indeed able 
to establish a global standard against the preference of the other great power. 
In the last ten years alone, coinciding with how long ago Drezner published his book, 53 
countries have adopted for the first time a single, comprehensive data protection law. 
According to the data gained from my sample, the countries who have adopted legislation in 
this time-period can be expected to have adopted legislation similar to the European 
legislation. Therefore, there is a clear trend toward the European standard, without the US 
signing on to it. It has to be concluded that the EU is able to establish (be that actively or 
passively) its own standard in the world without support from and even against the 
preferences of the US.  If one of the standards is becoming the de-facto standard in the world, 
while one of the powers has not adopted it, then it would not conform to the classification 
created by Drezner, as one of the great powers was able to establish a global standard against 
the preference of the other great power.  
But Drezner’s position can also be defended. Yes, other countries seem to sign on to the 
European standard, but can a standard truly be considered dominant if the US does not 
support it? This is to some degree a question of semantics and personal conviction more than 
facts, but I would argue that given the findings, the European standard can be called 
dominant. Additionally, given how the world is developing, it does seem to be only a question 
of time until also the US will come around and adopt legislation to deal with the fallout of 
technical development. 
In conclusion it does seem like market power is required to establish a global standard, 
although it also does not seem to be sufficient to prevent another great power from 
establishing its standard as the global standard. 
6.2 Regulatory capacity – Do countries just trust EU expertise? 
Bradford assesses that market size is not sufficient to shape global regulation. Regulatory 
capacity is her second condition, meaning that jurisdictions must consciously decide to 
become a source of regulation and have “regulatory expertise and resources” to enforce such 
legislation (Bradford, 2012, p. 12). In the area of data protection legislation, no other region 
in the world has more expertise and resources than Europe. There is a unique tradition of 
appointing data protection authorities and due to the high GDP of European countries these 
agencies tend to be well staffed. The French data protection authority for example has 195 
employees and a yearly budget of 16 million euros (CNIL, 2018). The German authority has 
160 employees and a budget of 15 million euros (BMF, 2018; BfDI, 2017). These authorities 
are also not reluctant to engage with international companies to enforce European law. The 
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Belgian data protection authority for example fined Facebook 125 million euros in 2018 
(Bendix, 2018).  
Apart from this internal enforcement, the EU has actively attempted to enforce its standard 
around the world. Drezner sees the EU adequacy system introduced by the Directive 95 as an 
attempt to prevent the circumvention of its privacy rules (details see chapter 3.4.4). This has 
prompted some other states to adopt similar rules to gain access to the EU market and until 
today eleven countries have obtained adequacy decisions from the Commission, most being 
small states inside Europe or within its vicinity (European Commission, 2018). The US, 
however, as one of the two great powers with a rivalling standard did not accept the EU 
regulation. It negotiated a compromise (the safe harbour system) where US companies could 
self-certify that they comply to EU rules when processing EU citizens' data, but the country 
itself did not have to adopt legislation similar to the EU Directive. This compromise was 
notoriously poorly enforced, with companies not adhering to the rules and both the US 
government and the European Commission trying to hide this fact, in order to not endanger 
trade between the two blocs (Drezner, 2008, p. 105; Stupp, 2017). 
Bradford also mentions the adequacy decision system (Bradford, 2012, p. 24), a system that 
appears to contradict her. As mentioned before, she does not expect the EU to require 
coercive measures, yet the adequacy decision system could be regarded as a unilateral 
coercive system. It forces other countries to adopt a system that offers at least the same 
protections as the European one. But there is another contradiction here. Bradford, as does 
Drezner, goes into the Safe Harbour agreement between the US and the EU. Bradford paints 
it much more as a win for the EU than for the US, as she regards the adequacy system to be 
a sign of the US accepting the EU approach. She does not mention the enforcement issues 
that have plagued the certification scheme. These issues could be interpreted as the US 
having never actually accepted the EU approach. The CJEU struck down the adequacy system 
for that exact reason in 2015 (Schrems case, CJEU, C‑362/14). Safe Harbor was de-facto 
continued with the Privacy Shield, showing the Commission was not willing to endanger trade 
with the United States over data protection and unable to force the other great power to adopt 
its standard against its preferences. Therefore, the EU has not actually influenced the US 
legislation much in data protection through this and apparently preferred to protect its trade 
interests. Bradford’s interpretation of the development lines up much more neatly with her 
prediction that the EU is able to shape global policy, in opposition to Drezner’s interpretation 
that the resistance of the US has led to no global standard emerging. 
In conclusion, it does not seem that the adequacy system, with its somewhat coercive 
elements have had such a great impact, as neither the United States, nor a high number of 
third countries have pursued an adequacy decision. In this, Bradford seems to overestimate 
the external enforcement impact. As will be argued in the following sections, the regulatory 
capacity as legal and technological subject matter know-how and available resources do play 
a very crucial role. 
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6.3 Preference for strict rules – Do countries want higher or lower standards? 
More than its coercive enforcement abilities, I will argue that the reason for why some states 
are adopting the European approach is the fact that the Europeans possess the expertise and 
willingness to set strict standards when it comes to legislation. Countries that are content 
with less strict legislation can orient themselves toward the Asian, OCED or African 
frameworks. My data shows they are increasingly not doing so, but opt for strict legislation, 
in line with the European one. It therefore appears that this aspect does play a role in 
countries choosing a standard to converge to. The European countries are leading the world 
on strict data protection legislation because they have a long tradition of regulating this area 
and have invested in building regulatory experience and expertise. This means they have the 
knowledge tools to actually create strict legislation, something that many other countries do 
no possess, because data protection is not such a present topic in these countries. Almost all 
of the strict principles of data protection originate from European legislation (see table 18 in 
annex), and most countries do not have the know-how to go their own way in a field that is 
highly complex, technical and legalistic, being strongly affected by long-term impact 
assessments and the evaluation of unintended consequences. For this reason, countries may 
opt to follow the trusted and established EU standard. This means that regulatory capacity 
(being regulatory expertise and resources) and preference for strict rules are closely 
intertwined as conditions.  
Bradford theorises that companies prefer strict rules, because it allows them to adapt their 
products to one set of regulations and then sell those products all over the world. They then 
lobby their governments to adopt legislation similar to the standard they already adhere to, 
to level the playing field with local competitors that choose not to follow the strict rules. This 
specific causality is possible, but its assessment is out of scope for this thesis, as it is not a 
state-driven action. 
Bradford’s theory is built on the California effect, a theory that speaks about how a regulatory 
race to the top can ensue when one legislator is setting high standards (see chapter 2.4 for 
more details). In similar fashion Vogel & Kagan (2002) have, based on Vogels California 
effect, further developed it to apply to globalisation and arrive at the conclusion that in many 
policy areas and cases no race to the bottom occurs globally. Popular media and NGOs tend 
to report on globalisation as a catalyst for more lenient legislation and therefore a race to the 
bottom, for example in labour or environmental regulation (Keegan, 2014; Weyler, 2016).  
Data, with its unterritorial nature initially seems to be a prime suspect for a regulatory race to 
the bottom as companies can theoretically change their jurisdiction, forcing other countries 
to also lower their standards to attract companies to their area, which would make data 
protection an inelastic target and data non-divisible product. The following two sections will 
discuss this in more detail, but it can already be said that the identified global shift to the 
stricter European standard therefore also means that at least in data protection, globalisation 
seems to have not led to a global race to the bottom, but the exact opposite.  
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6.4 Inelastic targets – Is the EU not regulating some markets? 
Drezner concentrates his analysis of internet governance on the fact that the internet 
“overcomes all barriers of […] borders” (Drezner, 2008, p. 91). He considers the main issue 
of internet (and privacy) governance to be the possibility for private actors to circumvent 
“bothersome regulations” (Drezner, 2008, p. 91) by moving their official headquarters to a 
different jurisdiction, i.e. engaging in forum shopping. Bradford would classify a market with 
this kind of behaviour as an elastic market. Drezner’s analysis suffers to some degree from 
the velocity with which our understanding of the internet’s effects on our societies has 
developed and by extension of how different regulating the internet actually is from 
regulating any other part of society. For example, data-based companies like social media or 
data analytics firms could be tempted to choose less strict jurisdictions to have more freedom 
in processing personal data. Facebook has transferred its jurisdiction for non-EU citizens 
outside of the European Union, to not be required to process data under the strict EU rules 
for non-EU citizens (Hern, 2018). But crucially, Facebook is not allowed to move to another, 
non-EU jurisdiction for its EU users, which means the EU rules do still apply. Facebook's 
behaviour can therefore not be regarded as classic forum shopping.  
Companies in general are having more difficulties these days to engage in such behaviour, 
especially in developed markets such as Europe, for multiple reasons. The GDPR illustrates 
this. Firstly, legislation is becoming more tough in terms of the regulative application – the 
GDPR demands processing of EU citizen data to always be done under European rules, even 
if the processing is happening outside of EU territory, and with this addresses the immaterial 
nature of data. Secondly, the application of rules is being enforced through the possibility of 
very significant fines, increasing the cost of non-compliance. Lastly, public scrutiny has 
increased significantly in recent years, meaning that digital companies, of which many 
depend on usage by private individuals, risk losing their customers over non-adherence.  
When smaller markets adopt similar rules, as they increasingly do according to my data, very 
big technology companies have the possibility to circumvent these markets' legislation. If no 
or very few competitors exist, these companies can bet on the fact that these smaller 
territories might not enforce their rules. After all, losing a small market means little to huge 
multinationals, but losing a service to which there is no alternative would be hurtful for, and 
possibly anger, the citizens of these territories. Therefore, these smaller markets have little 
to no leverage against the big technology giants. The EU is not a small market though. Losing 
it would mean losing a potential userbase of 500 million. Market power, as pointed out 
before, is an influential tool.  
In brief, this means the field of data cannot fully be considered an elastic market, contrary 
what Drezner says. That doesn't make it a fully inelastic one either; Facebook is still able to 
move jurisdictions for its non-EU users, though if the GDPR framework continues to emerge 
as the dominant data protection framework worldwide, this remaining elasticity of the market 
will continue to decrease. 
This development ties into the general theme of regulators reasserting themselves over 
internet governance, which will be discussed in the next section. 
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Investigating more closely how Bradford frames predisposition to regulate inelastic targets, it 
seems that it is not actually a condition which applies to the EU as an actor in general. It 
appears to be a condition of the fields that her theory applies to. Logically, observing that "an 
actor is only regulating a selection of policy fields” is not an answer to the question "what 
condition is necessary for policy convergence to happen". This means that Bradford is 
attempting to restrict the policy fields that her theory applies to, but does not actually do this 
by excluding certain policy fields, but by putting a relatively arbitrary restriction on the EU as 
an actor. Restrictions on applicable policy fields have been pointed out by other authors 
writing about regulatory convergence, such as Fritz W. Scharpf and Gary Marks, who often 
suppose that regulatory globalisation only happens in a limited number of areas in 
environmental law (Bradford, 2012, p. 8). Bradford does a similar thing, but in doing so 
neglects that the EU is also regulating elastic markets, for example the financial market with 
the MiFID II and MiFIR Directives (Cox, 2018). Bradford's restriction seems then to be a 
product of a desire to fit this exception into a condition for the EU instead of putting 
restrictions on the applicability of her theory. Whether policy convergence is also happening 
in elastic markets exceeds the scope of this thesis, but assuming Bradford’s assumption that 
there is no convergence on those fields is correct, her theory should in general be just applied 
to fully inelastic markets. 
As has been discussed in this section, it does not seem like data protection is an elastic 
market, as regulators are increasingly able to effectively enforce data protection legislation 
also onto foreign companies. In conclusion means that this exception does not apply to data 
protection. 
6.5 Non-divisibility of standards – Broken by the balkanisation of the internet? 
In her discussion of non-divisibility of standards, Bradford classifies data as falling under 
technical non-divisibility, meaning that the product cannot be divided since that would be 
technically impossible. She purposes that if the EU would ask Google to change their data 
practices for European users, Google would be unable to do so only for European users and 
would have to adjust the practices for all (Bradford, 2012, p. 18). Already in the previous 
sections there have been examples as to why that is not necessarily the case, but especially 
the recent attempts of governments to regulate their “part” of the internet have shown that 
it is possible to cut the internet up and just regulate one’s own part, although such regulation 
seems to require the state to have a sufficient market size for private actors to respect the 
rules, as has been shown by how US internet companies like Google and Apple have adapted 
to Chinese, Russian and European internet regulation (Denyer, 2017; Tang, 2017). 
There is an increasing trend toward the “balkanisation” of the internet (Bleiberg & West, 
2014). Many countries, with EU countries and the EU itself leading the charge, are 
contributing to this process. Russia and other countries have passed laws that require 
localising data storage, meaning that data has to be stored in a data centre geographically 
located inside the jurisdiction (Barbour-Lacey, 2015). The CJEU has effectively mandated a 
localised version of the internet by creating the right to be forgotten, where only European 
users can request the deletion of their content when it is not relevant anymore and only 
Including but not limited to – What are the conditions for convergence? 
 
39 
European users are affected by the deletion (De Ruyck & Fraser, 2014). Companies are 
contributing too, offering localised products to other companies and consumers for specific 
markets based on the markets' preference. For example, Microsoft is offering a higher-cost 
version of its Office product to privacy-minded customers, which is hosted on German servers 
and therefore bound to German data protection law (Microsoft, n.d.). As has been mentioned 
before, it can be posited that governments are re-asserting their jurisdiction over the internet, 
which for long was thought to circumvent or slip underneath the regulatory power of 
countries. Through deconstructing the un-geographic nature of the internet and creating 
regional versions of it, governments have found a way to regulate the internet, at least insofar 
as their own population is concerned. 
Taking these developments into account, it shows that data (related to the person or not) 
does not seem to be a non-divisible product as posited by Bradford and it is possible for 
companies and countries alike to break up data according to territory-specific rules. As policy 
convergence seems to be happening in data protection and since data is not an non-divisible 
product, my findings contract Bradford on this point. 
But this condition presents this analysis with another issue. Though Bradford lists it as one of 
her conditions, in her description it is actually not a condition, but a trigger for regulatory 
convergence to actually be initiated, given that the other conditions are met. It should have 
consequently not been classified as such and, from a general perspective (meaning not 
applied to this case), I therefore argue that the theory is left with only three conditions and 
one trigger. But since I argue that non-divisibility does not apply to data and therefore data 
protection as a field, it additionally means that in this case, it leaves Braford without a trigger 
for her theory. As has been discussed in chapter 2.2, fulfilling all conditions is not itself 
sufficient to cause convergence; policy convergence requires a trigger to start the process.  
At this point it also becomes relevant how Drezner and Bradford look differently at how the 
spread of convergence works. It is noticeable that Drezner regards the process of 
establishing a regulatory standard as an active one: one of the big powers is actively 
attempting to shape global policy. In Bradford’s theory, on the other hand, the process is 
happening in a more automatic fashion: even though she does identify a cause or trigger, as 
mentioned before, she still believes that the EU’s rules are becoming the global standard not 
because the EU is attempting to achieve this, but because it makes most sense for everyone 
else involved. Based on my argumentation, I would agree. 
6.6 Usage of NGOs/IGOs – Does the EU need NGO/IGO allies? 
The last condition discussed by the two authors is the state’s usage of NGOs and IGOs to 
advance its own regulatory standard. Drezner assigns multiple roles to NGOs and IGOs, but 
if one interprets his classification of standards in a strict way, data protection is a field with 
rival standards, as the US has not taken up the EU standard, and for this case he does not 
assign a role to NGOs or IGOs. If one assumes, however, as the data suggests, that the 
European standard has to some degree achieved regulatory convergence, the applicable type 
is a harmonised standard and in this case NGOs and IGOs are tasked with regime 
management (Drezner, 2008, p. 88). 
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It can be deduced from Bradford’s discourse on the Brussels effect that she regards it as a 
process without a need for coercion or international institutions. Bradford says: “[T]he EU is 
not coercing others to adopt its rules either. Market forces are sufficient to create ‘involuntary 
incentives’ to adjust to the rules of the strict regulator” (Bradford, 2012, p. 9). Because of 
globalisation, companies have an incentive to take up this standard, even when the EU has 
formally no influence on this. Her assertion that the EU does not require international 
institutions for promulgating its regulatory standard may be initially surprising, given the EU’s 
propensity to turn to multilateral solutions through multilateral institutions, such as the 
United Nations, the OECD, the WTO and others in an effort to promote the EU’s point of view 
when it comes to international regulation. On closer view, it becomes clear that she is not 
negating this behaviour, but her analysis is taking a different point of view. She writes that 
there is no “political globalisation of regulatory standards” (Bradford, 2012, p. 4), as there is 
no negotiated standard. With the Brussels effect she describes a process that sets in, when 
there is no global standard per rules, but it is becoming a global standard because there is a 
strong incentive for other countries and companies to accept the EU standard out of their own 
interests and there is no promotion through international or multinational organisations 
required.  
Though the Council of Europe (an IGO) has developed a data protection regime before the 
European Union, it can be said that both the CoE and the EU have supported each other in the 
process of promulgating similar data protection rules around the world. The EU has 
encouraged other states to join the open Convention 108 of the Council of Europe and closely 
coordinates with the IGO (see more on this in chapter 3.4.2). Many CoE member countries, 
including Russia, that are not EU members, are therefore adhering to a European standard. 
The Council membership ensure that those countries stay within the confines of the European 
standard. My data indicates though that the Convention 108 is increasingly becoming a 
baseline standard, like the OECD and APEC standard, as countries are advancing to stricter 
standards, more akin to the new EU regulation. The IGOs importance is difficult to ascertain, 
but it could be argued that the Council of Europe was important to promulgate the European 
standard in the past, but since now countries are adopting GDPR-like legislation, this support 
might not be needed anymore, even if it may be helpful in fostering baseline adherence. 
6.7 What are the conditions for convergence? 
Having analysed my own data and data protection frameworks, the conditions and causes 
Drezner and Bradford identified and having applied it to the case, I arrive at conclusions that 
differ in a number of aspects from Drezner and Bradford. These differences are summarised 
in the below table. 
Cause or Condition 
Drezner (2008), 
own revision 
Bradford (2012), 
own revision 
Own analysis on data 
protection case 
Market power Hybrid Condition Condition 
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No convergence against great 
power 
Condition Has happened Has happened 
Regulatory capacity Not a factor Condition Cause 
Preference for strict rules Not a factor Condition Condition 
Predisposition to regulate 
inelastic markets 
Not a factor 
Not a condition 
for actor, but 
an exception 
Not relevant, as data is 
an inelastic market 
Non-divisibility of standards Not a factor Cause 
Does not apply, as data 
is not a  
non-divisible product 
Effective NGO and IGO usage Hybrid Not a factor Possibly condition 
Table 16: Revised table of causes and conditions after analysis 
As a concluding analysis, I want to argue for a different cause of convergence in data 
protection regulation. Other countries are adopting the European standard because they 
want to profit from the European expertise on data protection. As I have put forth before, the 
European expertise in data protection legislation is unrivalled. This is based on a unique 
historical sensitivity for the topic, Europeans are especially watchful of the consequences of 
surveillance and therefore such concerns are a higher priority. This has led to Europeans 
leading this field in terms of legislative initiative. Since electronic data processing is 
inherently making surveillance more prevalent and more intrusive (computer systems as 
opposed to humans can and usually do log and save everything), this historic sensitivity has 
put the Europeans on the forefront of a technological as well as legal challenge, that an 
increasing number of countries have also identified and are now approaching also by 
adopting legislation. As my data shows, countries emulate the European approach by passing 
laws that are essentially very similar to the European ones. These countries are reacting to 
problem pressure based on technological changes and seem to arrive, based on a mix of 
lesson-drawing and emulation, at the same conclusion as the Europeans, but as my data 
shows, to some degree later. It does not appear that the EU is employing overtly coercive 
measures, other than enforcing its own laws for its own citizens. International harmonisation 
is happening to a limited degree, but does not look to play a crucial role. Economic concerns 
can also be used to explain to some degree why the United States has not given into this 
pressure. Most of the world’s data-driven companies are situated in the US (Statista, 2017); 
alas, this is not surprising, as lenient regulation allows data companies to innovate more 
easily with data-based business models. Regulating this area would endanger a business 
model that has brought huge wealth to these companies and its employees. Lawmakers in 
the United States are therefore understandably hesitant to follow this route. But most other 
countries in the world don’t risk big economic consequences when adopting strict data 
protection legislation, since few of their companies depend on data like in the US. Taking into 
account recent developments though, it is possible though that the belief will take over that 
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the societal risks of this technology outweigh the economic profit, especially since this 
economic profit it relative focused on a small amount of people. 
_____ 
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7 Conclusion 
This thesis set out to answer two questions: whether policy convergence is happening in data 
protection, and what that says about the conditions and causes for policy convergence as put 
forward by the two opposing theoretical frameworks of Drezner and Bradford. To answer 
these questions, I have collected and analysed my own empirical research data and 
confronted it with the development of global data protection legislation throughout the past 
couple of decades and the theories Drezner and Bradford developed. 
The answer to the first research question is quite clear: Policy convergence is happening in 
the field of data protection and the standard that seems to be becoming the dominant one is 
the European Union GDPR framework.  
The data also suggests there have been three phases of data protection law in the last twenty 
years, with ever increasing standards. The end of 90s and early 2000s saw the prevalence of 
lenient frameworks, such as the OCED and APEC guidelines and the original CoE Convention. 
From there on stricter frameworks took over, such as the Directive 95 and the additional 
protocol to the CoE Convention in 2001 and saw high adherence until the early to mid 2010s. 
Lastly, from the mid 2010s the strictest of the ages with the adoption of the GDPR has begun, 
with very high similarity in adopted legislation. It should be pointed out again here that the 
data sample was limited, so any conclusions drawn from them have to be treated with 
caution.  
The answer to the second research question is more complicated and nuanced. Drezner and 
Bradford have each put forth their own causes and conditions, in many cases disagreeing with 
each other.  
Possessing a very high degree of market power to project and enforce regulation is a clear 
condition, as both authors suggest. Though, analysing this condition in the case of data 
protection seems to contradict Drezner's suggestion that neither the EU nor the US can 
establish a standard that goes against the preferences of the other. The EU standard is in fact 
emerging as the dominant one and therefore this case study supports Bradford’s notion on 
this aspect. 
As opposed to what Bradford proposes, data is really not a non-divisible good, meaning data 
can be divided into smaller parts and therefore regulated differently in different territories. 
For Bradford non-divisibility is one of the conditions for why the European standard is 
emerging globally, meaning this part of her theory cannot hold up.  
In similar fashion, when it comes to inelastic markets (here defined as the possibility to 
circumvent legislation by forum shopping), both authors can be criticised. Bradford’s 
assumption that the EU tends to only regulate inelastic markets does not hold, even though 
in the end it has to be concluded that data is an inelastic market. Meanwhile, Drezner’s 
assumption that data is a fully elastic market, where companies can just change their 
jurisdiction, also seems to have been disproven, based on enforcement successes. 
A jurisdiction’s preference for strict rules was confirmed as a condition for policy convergence, 
as the European approach to data protection is uniquely strict as compared to other existing 
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data protection frameworks and this is where regulation worldwide is moving toward. The 
condition has been modified from Bradford’s outline, as she investigates a degree of private-
actor involvement that is out of the scope of this thesis. 
Lastly, regulatory capacity turned out to be a crucial aspect and I argue that the Europeans' 
regulatory expertise and resources, in connection with their preference for strict rules is 
actually the cause for the emerging dominance of the European standard. European history 
has made regulators and enforcement authorities possess unique know-how and resources 
in and for this complex field, making them the legislator who knows best how to write the 
rules in a stringent and effective way. Other countries are therefore looking towards the EU 
in order to adopt strict and sensible legislation and for this reason are adopting the European 
standard. 
It is clear that some of Drezner's and Bradford's conclusions do not hold up when confronted 
with the case of data protection, a case which they have both themselves elevated as a test 
case for their theory. Neither Drezner's opinion, whose theory is more US-aligned, nor 
Bradford's stance, whose theory is more Europe-friendly, has been completely proven or 
disproven. Taking only their main argument - whether the European Union can shape global 
policy alone or not - the conclusion in the case of data protection is that seemingly it can. 
That means the European Union at the least can pick up policy leadership in this one, for the 
future very important, area. Whether the EU can perform the same feat in other areas, 
however, is a different question. 
The question of the characteristics of European leadership in data protection regulation alone 
provides many promising avenues for future research. One could develop a fully 
comprehensive new theoretical approach to policy convergence or approach the topic from 
normative angles, such as analysing the EU’s motivations in this field and its role as a norm-
setter. Questions of cultural imperialism and colonialism are also evident. A much more in-
depth investigation into all legislation as well as a country-by-country discussion of the 
emergence of the European standard in a more nuanced way would undoubtedly offer 
additional interesting insights. 
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Appendix 
Overview of data protection frameworks 
Regime Country/Organisation Introduced Short in tables 
Guidelines on the Protection of Privacy and Transborder Flows of 
Personal Data 
Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) 
1980 OECD (1980) 
Convention for the Protection of Individuals with regard to 
Automatic Processing of Personal Data 
Council of Europe (CoE) 1981 CoE (1981) 
Directive 95/46/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of 24 October 1995 on the protection of individuals with regard to 
the processing of personal data and on the free movement of such 
data  
European Union (EU) 1995 Directive (1995) 
Additional Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of 
Individuals with regard to Automatic Processing of Personal Data, 
regarding supervisory authorities and transborder data flows 
Council of Europe (CoE) 2001 CoE (2001) 
APEC Privacy Framework (Original 2005 version) 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) 
2005 APEC (2005) 
Supplementary Act A/SA.1/01/10 on Personal Data Protection 
within ECOWAS 
Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) 
2010 ECOWAS (2010) 
Guidelines Governing the Protection of Privacy and Transborder 
Flows of Personal Data (2013 revision) 
Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) 
2013 OECD (2013) 
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APEC Privacy Framework (2015 revision) 
Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation 
(APEC) 
2015 APEC (2015) 
Regulation (EU) 2016/679 of the European Parliament and of the 
Council of 27 April 2016 on the protection of natural persons with 
regard to the processing of personal data and on the free 
movement of such data  
European Union (EU) 2016 GDPR (2016) 
Table 17: Overview of data protection frameworks 
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Frameworks and questionnaire questions 
Principles 
OECD 
(1980) 
CoE 108 
(1981) 
Directive 
(1995) 
CoE 108 
(2001) 
APEC 
(2005) 
ECOWAS 
(2010) 
OECD 
(2013) 
APEC 
(2015) 
GDPR 
(2016) 
CoE 108 
(2017) 
Automated decision making: Prohibition n n n n n y n n n n 
Automated decision making: Right to object n n y n n n n n y y 
Automated decision-making: Right to logic 
information n n y n n n n n y y 
Base principles: Demonstrate compliance trough 
certification n n n n n n n n y n 
Base principles: Legally binding and enforceable n y y y n y n n y y 
Base principles: Rights apply irrespective of 
nationality n n y n n y n n y y 
Collection requirement: Data subject consent y y y y n y y n y y 
Collection requirement: Fair and lawful collection y y y y y y y y y y 
Collection requirement: Legitimate purpose n y y y n y n n y y 
Collection requirement: Sensitive data n y y y n y n n y y 
Data controller obligation: Appoint a DPO n n n n n n n n y n 
Data controller obligation: Data accuracy y y y y y y y y y y 
Data controller obligation: Data minimsation n y y y n y n n y y 
Data controller obligation: Data protection by default n n n n n n n n y y 
Data controller obligation: Data protection by design n n n n n n n n y y 
Data controller obligation: Easily understandable 
information n n n n n n n n y n 
Data controller obligation: Notification n n y n n n y n y y 
Data controller obligation: Processing information n n y n y y n y y y 
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Data controller obligation: Risk or impact 
assessments n n n n n n y n y y 
Data subject right: Data portability n n n n n n n n y n 
Data subject right: Judicial recourse n y y y n n n n y y 
Data subject right: Right to access y y y y y y y y y y 
Data subject right: Right to be forgotten n n n n n n n n y n 
Data subject right: Right to correction y y y y y y y y y y 
Data subject right: Right to remedy y y y y n n y n y y 
Derogation from rights: Public interest y y y y y y y y y y 
DPA: Can impose fines n n n n n n n n y y 
DPA: Judicial review of DPA decision n n y y n y n n y y 
DPA: Non-jurisdiction controllers have to assign a 
representative for the DPA n n n n n n n n y n 
DPA: Required n n y y n y y n y y 
General principle: Preventing harm n n n n y n n y n n 
Liability: Data controller and processers n n n n n n n n y y 
Processing requirement: Purpose limitation n y y y y y n y y y 
Requirement: Data security y y y y y y y y y y 
Territorial scope: Data has to be processed according 
to rules of the data subject jurisdiction no matter 
where the processing is taking place 
n n n n n n n n y n 
Trans-border data flow: adequacy system n n y n n y n n y y 
Trans-border data flow: Privacy may not restrict free 
flow of personal data y n y n y n y y y y 
Trans-border data flow: Restrictions on y n y y n y n n y y 
Table 18: Frameworks and questionnaire questions 
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List of data protection acts 
Country Has law From Latest Region DPA 
Afghanistan  No   Asia None 
Albania Yes 2008 2012 Europe (ex EU) Commissioner for Personal Data Protection 
Algeria  No   Africa None 
Andorra Yes 2003  Europe (ex EU) Andorran Agency of Data Protection 
Angola Yes 2011  Africa Agência de Proteção de Dados (APD) 
Antigua and Barbuda Yes 2013  Americas Information Commissioner 
Argentina Yes 2000  Americas Dirección Nacional de Protección de Datos Personales(DNPDP) 
Armenia Yes 2002 2015 Europe (ex EU) Personal Data Protection Agency 
Aruba Yes 2011  Americas Unknown 
Australia Yes 1988 2012 Oceania Privacy Commissioner 
Austria Yes 1978 2018 EU Datenschutzbehörde 
Azerbaijan Yes 1998 2010 Europe (ex EU) None 
Bahamas Yes 2003  Americas Data Protection Commissioner for the Bahamas 
Bahrain  No   Asia None 
Bangladesh  No   Asia None 
Barbados  Yes 2001  Americas Unknown 
Belarus  Yes 2007  Europe (ex EU) None 
Belgium Yes 1992 2018 EU Commission for the Protection of Privacy 
Belize  No   Americas None 
Benin Yes 2009  Africa Commission Nationale de l'Informatique et des Libertés 
Bermuda Yes 2016  Americas Privacy Commissioner of Bermuda 
BES Islands Yes 2010  Americas Commission supervision data protection BES 
Bhutan  Yes 2006  Asia None 
Bolivia  Yes 2011  Americas None 
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Country Has law From Latest Region DPA 
Bosnia and Herzegovina Yes 2006  Europe (ex EU) Personal Data Protection Agency 
Botswana  No   Africa None 
Brazil  Draft 2011  Americas None 
Brunei No   Asia None 
Bulgaria Yes 2002 2018 EU Bulgarian data protection authority 
Burkina Faso Yes 2004  Africa Commission for Computer and Civil Liberties 
Burma (Myanmar)  No   Asia None 
Burundi  No   Africa None 
Cambodia  No   Africa None 
Cameroon  No   Africa None 
Canada Yes 1983 2002 Americas Office of the Privacy Commissioner of Canada 
Cape Verde Yes 2001  Africa Comissão Nacional de Proteção de Dados Pessoais 
Central African Republic  No   Africa None 
Chad Yes 2015  Africa None 
Chile Yes 1999 2012 Americas Consejo para la Transparencia (CplT) 
China No   Asia Cyberspace Administration of China 
Colombia Yes 2008 2012 Americas Superintendence of Industry and Commerce of Colombia 
Comoros  No   Africa None 
Congo, Dem. Rep. of No   Africa None 
Congo, Rep. of No   Africa None 
Costa Rica Yes 2011 2013 Americas PRODHAB 
Côte d'Ivoire  Yes 2013  Africa Autorité de protection des données à caractère personnel 
Croatia Yes 2003 2018 EU Croatian Personal Data Protection Agency  
Cuacao Yes 2010  Americas Unknown 
Cuba  No   Americas None 
Cyprus Yes 2001 2018 EU Commissioner for Personal Data Protection 
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Country Has law From Latest Region DPA 
Czech Republic Yes 1992 2018 EU Office for Personal Data Protection 
Denmark Yes 1978 2018 EU Datatilsynet 
Djibouti  No   Africa None 
Dominica  Draft 2011  Americas None 
Dominican Republic Yes 2013  Americas Instituto Dominicano de las Telecomunicaciones 
Dubai Yes 2007  Asia None 
East Timor No   Africa None 
Ecuador  Draft 2016  Americas None 
Egypt  No   Africa None 
El Salvador  No   Americas None 
Equatorial Guinea Yes 2016  Africa Personal Data Protection Governing Authority  
Eritrea  No   Africa None 
Estonia Yes 2003 2018 EU Estonian Data Protection Inspectorate 
Ethiopia  No   Africa None 
Faroe Islands Yes 2001 2004 Europe (ex EU) Faroese Data Protection Agency 
Fiji  No   Oceania None 
Finland Yes 1987 2018 EU Data Protection Ombudsman 
France Yes 1978 2018 EU La Commission Nationale de l’Informatique et des Liberte ś (CNIL)  
Gabon Yes 2011  Africa National Commission for the Protection of Personal Data  
Gambia  Yes 2009  Africa Unknown 
Georgia Yes 2011  Europe (ex EU) Office of the Personal Data Protection Inspector 
Germany Yes 1977 2018 EU Bundesbeauftragte für den Datenschutz und die Informationsfreiheit 
Ghana Yes 2012  Africa Data Protection Commission 
Gibraltar Yes 2004  Europe (ex EU) Data Protection Commissioner 
Greece Yes 1997 2018 EU Data Protection Authority 
Greenland Yes 1979 2016 Americas Unknown 
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Country Has law From Latest Region DPA 
Grenada  No   Americas None 
Guatemala  No   Americas None 
Guernsey Yes 1986 2010 Europe (ex EU) Data Protection Office 
Guinea  No   Africa None 
Guinea-Bissau  No   Africa None 
Guyana  No   Americas None 
Haiti  No   Americas None 
Honduras Draft 2013  Americas Institute for the Access to Public Information 
Hong Kong SAR Yes 1995 2002 Asia Office of the Privacy Commissioner for Personal Data 
Hungary Yes 1992 2018 EU National Authority for Data Protection and Freedom of Information 
Iceland Yes 1989 2010 EU Icelandic Data Protection Authority 
India Yes 2011  Asia Data Security Council for India  
Indonesia Yes 2016  Asia Unknown 
Iran Yes 2003  Asia None 
Iraq  No   Asia None 
Ireland Yes 1988 2018 EU Office of the Data Protection Commissioner 
Isle of Man Yes 1986 2002 Europe (ex EU) Data Protection Supervisor  
Israel Yes 1981  Asia Privacy Protection Authority 
Italy Yes 1996 2018 EU Garante per la protezione dei dati personali 
Jamaica  Draft 2012  Americas Unknown 
Japan Yes 2003 2015 Asia Personal Information Protection Commission 
Jersey Yes 1987 2005 Europe (ex EU) Data Protection Office 
Jordan  Draft 2016  Asia None 
Kazakhstan  Yes 2013 2015 Asia Unknown 
Kenya  Draft 2012  Africa None 
Kiribati No   Oceania None 
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Country Has law From Latest Region DPA 
Kosovo Yes 2010  Europe (ex EU) National Agency for the Protection of Personal Data 
Kuwait  Yes 2014  Asia Unknown 
Kyrgyz Republic Yes 2008  Asia State Registration Service 
Laos  No   Asia None 
Latvia Yes 2000 2018 EU Data State Inspectorate 
Lebanon  No   Asia None 
Lesotho Yes 2011  Africa Data Protection Commission 
Liberia  No   Africa None 
Libya No   Africa None 
Liechtenstein Yes 2002 2015 Europe (ex EU) Datenschutzstelle 
Lithuania Yes 1996 2018 EU State Data Protection Inspectorate 
Luxembourg Yes 1979 2018 EU Commission Nationale pour la Protection des Données (CNPD) 
Macao SAR Yes 2006  Asia Office for Personal Data Protection 
Macedonia (FYROM) Yes 1994 2005 Europe (ex EU) Directorate for Personal Data Protection 
Madagascar Yes 2015  Africa Commission Malagasy sur l'Informatique et des Libertés 
Malawi Yes 2016  Africa Unknown 
Malaysia Yes 2010 2013 Asia Personal Data Protection Commissioner 
Maldives  No   Asia None 
Mali Yes 2013  Africa Personal Data Protection Authority, Mali 
Malta Yes 2001 2018 EU Office of the Information and Data Protection Commissioner 
Marshall Islands  No   Oceania None 
Mauritania  No   Africa None 
Mauritius Yes 2017  Africa Data Protection Office 
Mexico Yes 2010 2016 Americas Federal Institute for Access to Information and Data Protection 
Micronesia No   Oceania None 
Moldova Yes 2007 2011 Europe (ex EU) National Center for Personal Data Protection 
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Country Has law From Latest Region DPA 
Monaco Yes 1993 2015 Europe (ex EU) Commission for Control of Personal Data 
Mongolia No   Asia None 
Montenegro Yes 2008 2012 Europe (ex EU) Agency for Protection of Personal Data and Free Access to Information 
Morocco Yes 2009  Africa Data Protection National Commission 
Mozambique  No   Africa None 
Namibia  No   Africa None 
Nauru No   Oceania None 
Nepal Yes 2007  Asia Unknown 
Netherlands Yes 1988 2018 EU Autoriteit Persoonsgegevens  
New Zealand Yes 1993 2010 Oceania Privacy Commissioner Office 
Nicaragua Yes 2012  Americas Unknown 
Niger  Yes 2017  Africa Unknown 
Nigeria  Draft 2011  Africa None 
Norway Yes 1978 2010 EU Datatilsynet 
Oman  No   Asia None 
Pakistan  Draft 2005  Asia None 
Palau  No   Oceania None 
Panama  Draft 2016  Americas None 
Papua New Guinea  No   Oceania None 
Paraguay No   Americas None 
Peru Yes 2011  Americas Dirección de Protección de Datos Personales 
Philippines Yes 2012  Asia National Privacy Commission 
Poland Yes 1997 2018 EU Inspector General for the Protection of Personal Data 
Portugal Yes 1991 2018 EU Comissäo Nacional de Protecçäo de Dados 
Qatar Yes 2016  Asia Unknown 
Romania Yes 2001 2018 EU National Supervisory Authority For Personal Data Processing 
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Russia Yes 2006 2014 Europe (ex EU) Roscomnadzor 
Rwanda  No   Africa None 
Samoa  No   Oceania None 
San Marino Yes 1983 1995 Europe (ex EU) Unknown 
São Tomé and Príncipe  Yes 2016  Africa Unknown 
Saudi Arabia  No   Asia None 
Senegal Yes 2008  Africa Commission de protection des données personnelles 
Serbia Yes 2008  Europe (ex EU) 
Commissioner for Information of Public Importance and Protection of 
Personal Data 
Seychelles Yes 2003  Africa Office of the Data Protection Commissioner 
Sierra Leone No   Africa None 
Singapore Yes 2012  Asia Personal Data Protection Commission 
Slovakia Yes 1992 2018 EU Data Protection Office of the Slovak Republic 
Slovenia Yes 1990 2018 EU Information Commissioner of the Republic of Slovenia 
Solomon Islands  No   Oceania None 
Somalia  No   Africa None 
South Africa Yes 2013  Africa Information Regulator 
South Korea Yes 1994 2015 Asia Ministry of the Interior 
Spain Yes 1992 2018 EU Spanish Data Protection Commissioner’s Office 
Sri Lanka  No   Africa None 
St. Kitts and Nevis  Draft 2012  Americas None 
St. Lucia Yes 2011  Americas Unknown 
St. Maartens Yes 2010  Americas Personal Data Protection Supervisory Committee 
St. Vincent and the 
Grenadines  Yes 2003  Americas Unknown 
Sudan  No   Africa None 
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Suriname  No   Americas None 
Swaziland  Draft 2013  Africa None 
Sweden Yes 1973 2018 EU Datainspektionen 
Switzerland Yes 1992 2006 EU Federal Data Protection and Information Commissioner 
Syria  No   Asia None 
Taiwan Yes 1995 2010 Asia National Communication Commission 
Tajikistan  No   Asia None 
Tanzania No   Africa None 
Thailand Yes 1997  Asia None 
Togo  No   Africa None 
Tonga No   Oceania None 
Trinidad and Tobago  Yes 2011  Americas Office of the Information Commissioner 
Tunisia Yes 2004  Africa National Personal Data Authority, Tunisia 
Turkey Yes 2016  Europe (ex EU) Kişisel Verileri Koruma Kurumu 
Turkmenistan  No   Asia None 
Tuvalu No   Oceania None 
Uganda Draft 2015  Africa None 
Ukraine Yes 2010 2017 Europe (ex EU) Ukrainian Parliament Commissioner for Human Rights  
United Arab Emirates Yes 2015  Asia Commissioner of Data Protection 
United Kingdom Yes 1984 2018 EU Information Commissioner’s Office 
United States No   Americas None 
Uruguay Yes 2008  Americas Unidad Reguladora y de Control de Datos Personales 
Uzbekistan  No   Asia None 
Vanuatu  No   Oceania None 
Venezuela  No   Americas None 
Vietnam Yes 2010  Asia Unknown 
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Yemen Yes 2012  Asia Unknown 
Zambia  No   Africa None 
Zimbabwe Yes 2002  Africa Unknown 
Table 19: List of data protection acts and authorities 
 
